private reason, public passions, and the predicament of the political elite

Ghassan Su`ud has an article on elite marriages in Lebanon with a fascinating list of who is married to whom. It is interesting that a lot of these marriages cut across not only regional and local political divides, but, as the article points out, also sectarian ones. The latter is the case with the recent marriage between Nayla Twayni, recently elected member of parliament and daughter of assassinated Jubran Twayni, and Malik Maktabi, host of the show Ahmar bil Khatt al-`Arid — a recent episode of which provoked the ire of Saudi authorities into shutting down the LBC office in Jaddah. Since the Twaynis are a well-known Orthodox family and the Maktabis are Shiite, the marriage was cited by some as a living example of coexistence in Lebanon.

Rather than testify to some evasive form of Lebanese coexistence, however, these intersectarian marriages point to a double standard in the lives of some elite. Though her choice of spouse would lead one to expect a political career free of sectarian jingoism, when Nayla Twayni was campaigning in Ashrafiyah last spring, she more than once responded to attempts at undermining her “Orthodoxness” with counterattacks stressing al-`asab al-urthuduksi. The expression translates to “Orthodox vein,” which signifies a sense of belonging to a group. But the Arabic word `asab has a heavier thud to it, sharing its root with words such Ibn Khaldun’s `asabiyah, `asabi (nervous or quick to anger), and ta`assub (fanaticism). It remains to be seen, though, whether the same `asab will be struck with the electorate when the politician in question is a female entering into wedlock with a man with whom she will be spawning Shiite children.

If the recent election and marriage of Nayla bring some flagrant contradictions into relief, they are by no means unique to her. One is left wondering: is this a simple case of the elite cynically and hypocritically catering to and exploiting mass sentiments? Perhaps. But the use of this double standard of identification does not separate the elite form the masses as much as it separates the elite from themselves. The sort of individualism that we normally associate with European liberalism — the freedom to make one’s personal choices — finds an echo only in the personal aspect of the lives of the elite. In their public lives, however, their perpetuity remains bound to a system that reproduces them as an elite. This entails not only reproducing them as a category of the population — and hence the vigorous patriarchy — but also reproducing the communities that make them relevant as political leaders. The political significance of, say, the Pharaon family would be put to the test if there were no electoral body to be summoned as an “Orthodox” body to vote for members of the family as representatives — lack of political acumen notwithstanding.

As such, this public aspect of the political elite cannot be reduced to a cynical mask, for it is an integral aspect of their existence and probably even self-image as leaders. This dichotomy — between the personal and the political — is an ironic reversal of Hannah Arendt’s ideal types of the public and private spheres. With a suspicion of the private — the sphere of necessity, constraint, sameness, and passions — Arendt saw in the public realm as exemplified by the Greek polis the place for the exercise of decision, freedom, difference, and reason. In the case of the Lebanese elite, private lives are open to the virtues of the public sphere, as Arendt sees them, while their public lives are entangled in a most murderous web of political passions.

 

“we have the sea, we have Israel, and we have Syria”

Today, al-Akhbar released a transcript (with some omissions) of the closed meeting between Walid Junblat and the Druze sheikhs which had been previously leaked on youtube in April. The original leak offered a rare glimpse of the everyday politics of sectarianism in Lebanon. And while the leak might have been more sensational, today’s transcript contextualizes better Junblat’s aim in the meeting: convincing those present to work the Druze rank and file into accepting coexsitence with the Shi`a (read Hizballah).

Steps towards reconciliation between Junblat and Hizballah have been in the making since the Doha meeting this past summer. Junblat immediately issued several overtures which culminated in Na`im Qasim revealing Hizballah’s decision to open up to Walid Junblat and suggesting that a meeting between Junblat and Nasrallah is possible after — and probably also in light of — the elections. Junblat’s attempt at smoothing the Druze wrinkles of last May might very well be a preparation for such an eventuality.

What I find most interesting, however, is the argumentation method Junblat used to convince those present of helping him with his goal: reconciliation or bloodshed. Pursuant to his summary of “we have the sea, we have Israel, and we have Syria,” he said:

ولما كانت الحرب، كنت أطلب الذخيرة، كان حافظ الأسد يلبّي طلبي سريعاً (الواحد بدو يذكر المساوئ والمحاسن) كانت قوافل الذخيرة تأتي من جديدة يابوس حتى حمّانا… صحيح خضنا الحرب، لكن اليوم ماذا أفعل؟ من أين أحصل على الذخيرة؟ من البحر؟ أو من إسرائيل؟ لا، من إسرائيل لا…

When there was [civil] war, I used to ask for munitions and Hafiz al-Asad would swiftly fulfill my request (one has to remember both the good and the bad characteristics). Caravans of munitions used to come from Jdaydit Yabus to Hammana. It is true we went to war, but what do I do today? Where do I get munitions from? From the sea? Or from Israel? No, not form Israel…

A structurally similar line of “alliance with Hizballah or bust” was forwarded during the “debate” between Ibrahim Kanaan and Sami Gemayel on Kalam al-Nas last Sunday (if you can stand 2+ hours of shouting, you can watch it here). Responding to Gemayel’s (read, Kataeb’s) one trick pony of “the state über alles” and to the accusation that the Free Patriotic Movement is providing cover for Hizballah’s project for Islamicizing Lebanon, Kanaan responded that the alternative to coming to an understanding with Hizballah would be “committing suicide” (towards the end the episode).

Earlier in the Kalam al-Nas debate (a cross between a cockfight and a bad domestic argument), Kanaan accused Gemayel’s party of waging “a campaign of fear” when it comes to Hizballah (عم بتخوفوا الناس). That much is obvious. From billboards, to slogans, to speeches… capitalizing on the events of May 7th has pretty much been March 14th ticket this electoral campaign. But one has to ask oneself, are not alliances and rapprochements with Hizballah, when framed as Junblat and Kanaan frame them, also campaigns of fear? Hizballah, it seems to me, can be a very useful and flexible tool.

 

The Apostles of the Third Republic

The Disciples of the Third Republic

A few days ago, the Free Patriotic Movement released its electoral program: Towards the Third Republic (http://forum.tayyar.org/program/electoral.pdf). The concept is not new, Aoun discussed it at least as far back as 2001 (http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=22281&issueno=8088). But the FPM has brilliantly capitalized on it for this electoral campaign. The idea was elaborated on by Kanaan in an interview with al-Akhbar a while back (http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/60100). Briefly put:

1st: the weak, post-independence republic. According to Kanaan characterized by the political classes  inability “to protect Lebanon from regional push and pull. For the traditional political Lebanese school is built on internal power-sharing without a view of a regional, strategic role for Lebanon. So, this feeds the internal contradictions turning Lebanon into a battle ground for settling the scores.”  

2nd: the corrupt, post-taef republic. The Taef, again according to Kanaan, solved the first republic problem by inserting the need for an external valve, Syria, “whose role was to reign the rhythm of the political system, the adversary, and governance.”

3rd: the suggested, FPM third republic. In contrast to the first it is a strong state that shields Lebanon from the regional game and internal division and, in contrast to the second, it is a transparent and accountable system of governance.

There is much, much to say about this – both its ingeniousness and its contradictions – but I will just mention a few things I thought were interesting.

First, any periodization serves a purposes and is not self-given. For a different kind of periodization see for example Fawaz Traboulsi’s (leftist) periodization History of Lebanon with (1) mercantile period, (2) pro-western authoritarianism, (3) Shiabism and (4) crisis. In this instance, FPM’s periodization serves to orchestrate history as a series of movements culminating in an interpretation of the present as a moment of crisis due to weakness and corruption. Even more so, with its emphasis on a stable, almost final epoch, the third republic, it is almost messianic. This element of messianism is buttressed by a major backbone of the campaign advertisement deriving from a new testament verse (“But let your words be yes, yes, and no, no; for anything which adds to these is deception.” Matthew 5:34-37) So does Kannan’s use of the expression “rusul al-jumhiriyah al-thalithat” (disciples of the third republic)

This periodization is also informed by a derivative kind of history, one that references the history of France, the longest and first stable republic after a century of upheavals. Rajeh al-Khouri is right to ask why the third republic is stable (link). The answer is simple: because the third republic is stable. Of course, together with the “Sois belle et tais tois” (link) campaign advertisement and the new testament reference, it pins down the audience it is trying to appellate.

There is one last point to the periodization in question, and that is the less obvious de facto acceptance of a specific version of Lebanon’s post-independence history. The problem with this Lebanon, according to the third republic vision, is not its corruption, not its social and economic inequalities, not its marginalization of a large segment of its population. Although the electoral program diagnoses some problems that can be traced to the “first republic” (most prominent, the rural neglect), discursively – as far as I know – problems of corruption and bad management are only stressed in relation to the post-Taef (read, Hariri) period. The main problem with the “golden period” of Lebanon’s history is its weakness. As such, the FPM vision of history diverges from the “Maronite” history of Lebanon shared by its adversaries only in the

Last week, the Free Patriotic Movement unveiled its electoral program: Towards the Third Republic… (pdf). Aoun has discussed this concept at least as far back as 2001. But the Free Patriotic Movement has brilliantly capitalized on it for this electoral campaign. A while back, Ibrahim Kanaan elaborated in an interview with al-Akhbar on the three republics:

1st: the weak, post-independence republic. Characterized by the political classes’ divisions and thus inability “to protect Lebanon from regional forces.”

2nd: the corrupt, post-Taef republic. The Taef, again according to Kanaan, solved the first republic problem by inserting the need for an external valve, Syria. More importantly, this republic was corrupt and the cause behind the national debt.

3rd: the projected, FPM third republic. Characterized by a strong state, in contrast to the 1st, and a transparent and accountable system of governance, in contrast to the 2nd. Their impressive electoral program elaborates on how the party aims to achieve this vision.

There is much, much to say about the concept of the third republic – both its obvious ingeniousness and its less obvious assumptions – but I wanted to share a few things that struck me regarding its overall periodization.

First, any periodization is, of course, neither self-obvious nor given and, more often than not, serves a specific version of history. In this instance, FPM’s periodization builds on an existing one. It orchestrates history as a series of movements culminating in an interpretation of the present as a moment of crisis resulting from weakness and corruption. Even more so, with its emphasis on a stable, almost final epoch — “the third republic is stable” (see image) — this version of history borders on the messianic. The element of messianism is further buttressed by a major backbone of the electoral campaign deriving from the new testament verse ”Fal yakun kalamukum na`am, na`am, la, la” (“But let your words be yes, yes, and no, no; for anything which adds to these is deception.” Matthew 5:34-37). As if to further stress this point, in the al-Akhbar interview Kannan uses the expression “rusul al-jumhuriyah al-thalithah” (apostles of the third republic) to describe the party.

Second, this periodization is also informed by a derivative version of history, one that references the history of France, particularly the longest and first stable republic after a century of upheavals, la Troisième République. A Rajeh al-Khouri Op-Ed in al-Nahar asks: why is the third republic stable? The answer is simple: because la Troisième République was stable. But this is not merely a matter of translation. Together with the “Sois belle et vote” campaign advertisement and the new testament references, this leaves little doubt as to what audience will not only understand, but, more importantly, react to this as an “appellation,” to borrow from Althusser — i.e. recognizing themselves in an external projection that is in fact a barely disguised reflection of their inner conditioning. The function this performs — whether purposefully or not, whether successfully or not — is the reproduction of ideology.

There is one last point to the periodization in question, and that is the less obvious de facto acceptance of a specific version of Lebanon’s first republic. The problem with this Lebanon, according to FPM’s vision, is not its corruption, not its social and economic inequalities, not its marginalization of a large segment of its population. Although the electoral program diagnoses some problems that can be traced back to the first republic (rural neglect, for example), discursively, problems of corruption, bad management, and neglect are primarily stressed in relation to the post-Taef (read, Hariri) period. The main problem with the “golden period” of Lebanon’s pre-civil war history is, according to the third republic vision, primarily the weakness of the state. As such, whereas the FPM vision of history upon which “the third republic” builds diverges only in the more recent past from the “Maronite” history shared by its adversaries, it clashes dramatically with that of its allies.

 

the right to be without a sect

I have been swamped with teaching, so I have not been really paying attention to the news lately. So when I learned that I now have the option to actually remove my sect from my personal status register (Nufus) I had to rub my eyes and pinch myself. How did that happen?

Apart from increasing my respect for minister of interior, Ziad Baroud, even more, this is probably the only piece of news coming from Lebanon over the past few years that I find worth celebrating. As the atheist product of a mixed marriage, I take this personally. As a student of late Ottoman and modern history, I find it phenomenal.

Over the past 150+ years, the tendency in proto-Lebanon and Lebanon has been towards increasing institutionalization of sectarianism and the increasing intertwinement of the idea of citizenship with sect. This can be traced back to the contradictory 1856 Islahat Fermani, which, in the same breath, affirmed the sameness of the citizens of the Ottoman Empire while addressing them as nations/sects (millet). The various stops on the way — the 1860 Mount Lebanon war, the French Mandate reforms, the national pact, Taef, Hizballah’s political turn, etc — all in a long term perspective served to further entrench and institutionalize this intertwinement between citizen and sect.

Now this comes, a counter intuitive surprise considering the overall trend. It is, of course, nothing like a magical wave of the wand which undoes sect. Clearly, the parliament, voting system, and our “representative” “democracy” can continue along the same lines even if the very last citizen were to remove his sect from the register. Particularly when they are all based on a census whose population no longer exists.

But that is precisely why the option to remove one’s sect from the register is so phenomenal: the burden of responsiblity rests with me, as a person and citizen, to go tomorrow early morning and remove my sect from the Nufus register. And therein lies the challenge. What will become of it will only be a viable discussion once the widespread rejection of sectarian citizenship becomes fact. So, I find myself wondering, how many will do it? And how many will ask themselves: who am I if not my sect?

 

(sectarian) citizen and (sectarian) state

A couple of weeks ago, I was at a seminar where Geir O. Pedersen was main speaker. Pedersen is shifting from UN special envoy to Norwegian foreign ministry employee, which is why I suppose he felt more comfortable talking freely about the situation in the Middle East (although he did categorically refuse to comment on the suspected nuclear activity in Syria). I was pleasantly surprised to hear the man speak, elegantly and intelligently, on Lebanon and its various players.

He said what many understand by now: that the tension in Lebanon can only be resolved through diplomatic efforts on the Israeli-Syrian front and the Iranian-American front. His opinion was that Obama should strike the weakest link — Syria-Israel — and things will have a better chance to unfold. As far as Hizballah is concerned, he said two things. One, that they really did not expect Israel’s reaction in 2006 and, two, that Hizballah are the only ones who mean something in Lebanon (from the international politics point of view, as I understand).

Notwithstanding, I thought his analysis had a severe limitation that primarily had to do with where he comes from: a UN and a “statist” perspective. At one point, he characterized Lebanon as a place of contradictions between, for example, a modern democracy and a clanish/feudal system. My historical understanding of the clanish/feudal system is that it is part and parcel of our form of modern democracy and that is precisely why it is so difficult to get rid off.

Then, discussing Hizballah’s weapons, he explained that he had said to Hizballah (waving a disciplinary finger): you cannot decide in matters of peace and war, it is the government who should (not verbatim). The main question here is: is it possible to talk about “government” as if it was a neutral arbitrator of the affairs of the people? When sectarianism is so ingrained in the system, is the government not a sectarian player or conglomeration of players? Is this not at the heart of the problem of why the only “appellation” (to crudely use the already crude Althusser) that people collectively respond to is sect? Is it even possible to speak of politics in Lebanon without speaking of sects?

I see the two problems — of seeing sectarianism as a historic residue and of thinking of the government as neutral arbitrator — as related. Pedersen indirectly acknowledged that when he went through the different players in Lebanon: the Christians, the Sunni, the Shia. No government there. That he then moved to speak of “the government” in the case of Hizballah’s weapons is an indication that he does not grasp the depths to which sectarianism is rooted in our so-called democracy and that the two forms — of sectarianism and democracy — comfortably inhabit the same space.

 

delicious tidbits

• In the wake of Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s attack on Iran and the Shi`i expansionist threat it poses to Sunni Islam, rhetoric against Hizballah, Iran, and the Shi`a in general found new wind. Only this time, Salafi websites are using the writings of Christian kuffar to argue their finer points.

• Nawwaf Musawi, Hizballah international relations officer, attacked David Miliband for calling Hizballah’s militant arm terrorist, asking whether De Gaulle’s resistance from Britain was also terrorism, as Nazi propaganda called it back then. Musawi further stressed his point by likening Miliband’s characterization to Goebbel’s Nazi propaganda.

• With its transformation from financial to economic, the crisis finally made an entry to the Lebanese market… through the jewelry sector. Demand has apparently decreased by 50% [Note: maybe this means it is approaching normal]. While a certain class of people with investments abroad is obviously suffering over jewelry, the economy as a whole is now bracing for an upcoming world-wide recession.

• The Lebanese national debt is now at $48,414,000,000, or about 196.47% of the GDP. Have a nice day.

 

Saudi Arabia enters the electoral fray

So, what the hell just happened in the North? First, an overblown, negative reaction to a memorandum of understanding between Hizballah and (some) Salafis. Then, the Saudi ambassador makes a surprise visit to Tripoli, eliciting in his wake a delirious torrent about Tripoli being the be-all end-all of all Sunnis. And now, the reconciliation in Tripoli strikes, like a bolt of lightning from a clear sky.

Both the delirium and the reconciliation have been interpreted in the Lebanese press (some of it, as the case always is) as repercussions of the Saudi visit to Tripoli (and international pressure on Saudi). Muhammad al-Safadi, a billionaire politician with excellent connections in Saudi Arabia and some following in the north (he also happens to be Minister of Economy & Trade), made some statements last week confirming suspicions that Hariri Jr. is changing his policy and opening up to other Sunni parties.

Saudis, the story goes, have given up on the untalented Sa`d and are investing in a wider Sunni base under the banner of “unifying the Sunnis”. This, however, does not explain the portrayal of the Tripoli reconciliation as a Sa`d Hariri accomplishment, this despite the presence of Sanioura, Karami, and Safadi. Not to mention that Miqati decided not to join, sending a representative in his stead, and al-Ahdab, the harbinger of doom, did not show up in any incarnation. Disgruntlement, to say the least.

In light of this, there is another reading to these developments. The memorandum signed in the Mufti’s residence could be more of a move to shore up rather than undermine Hariri Jr. It is no secret that Hariri’s popularity took a dunk after last May and this has had its severest impact in the North. Although he does not face much competition in Beirut, with the presence of smaller players such as Karami, Miqati, and Safadi and with recent talk about a Safadi-Karami coalition for the next elections, Hariri might very well perform poorly in the North. This Sunni-Sunni reconciliation (no, not Alawi-Sunni, I am afraid), will work in Hariri’s favor.

Whichever the case may be, Saudi Arabia has used the influence it has on its Sunni friends and allies, to “facilitate” coalitions and perhaps even broaden Hariri’s electoral base. Election year in Lebanon is full of surprises and miracles. The blind see, the paralyzed move, and the dead are brought back to life. Considering that a Sunni-Sunni alliance of “moderates” will leave many in Tripoli disgruntled, it remains to be seen whether this miracle will have any impact on Jabal Muhsin and Tabbaneh.

 

my kingdom for a horse!

The Doha debates have reached an agreement on electing General Michel Sulayman as president, to be followed by the formation of a national unity government giving the Opposition veto power. Given that these were foregone conclusions in case of an agreement, it was the electoral law which constituted the final bargaining chip. Initially, the Opposition had suggested using the 1960 law, but the ruling coalition wanted a change in districts to reflect changing demographics. Hizballah categorically refused any changes in the south, leaving Beirut as the gordian knot in the negotiations.

According to the 1960 law, the Christians would compete over 8 seats in district 1 (Ashrafiyah, Rmayl, Mdawwar, Sayfi, Marfa’, and Mina al-Husn); 3 seats would be open to contestation in district 2 (Zqaq al-Blat, Bashurah, `Ayn al-Mraysah); and the Sunnis would get 5 seats in district 3 (Ras Beirut, Mazra`ah, and Msaytbah).

The ruling coalition’s proposal was to include Mdawwar and a majority Sunni area in district 2 and change the seat allocations to 5 (district 1), 8 (district 2), and 6 (district 3). This would have meant effectively that 14 seats, including 2 of 4 Armenian seats, would have been “elected” by a majority Sunni electorate in districts 2 & 3. This would have forced the Tashnag to broker a deal with the Hariris in order to save their hide in Mdawwar, which, in turn, would have constituted a blow to Aoun by depriving him of the Armenian vote. District 2, thus, became the bone of contention.

The compromise reached gives Hariri 10 seats, leaving the other 9 open to competition:

• District 1 (Ashrafiyah, Rmayl, and Sayfi), 5 seats: majority Chrisitian voters.
• District 2 (Bashurah, Mdawwar, and Marfa’), 4 seats: majority Christian, mostly Armenian voters, with a balance of Sunni/Shiite backup.
• District 3 (Mazra`ah, Msaytbah, Ras Beirut, Minah al-Husn, Dar al-Mraysah, Marfa’), 10 seats: majority Sunni voters.

Hariri insisted on that last, face-saving 10th seat in district 3, which gives his list a majority of Beirut’s seats regardless of the results of his Christian allies. “A horse! A horse! My kingdom for a horse!” he cried.

In other words, Hizballah has translated its military action into a political victory (they got their third in cabinet and a new electoral law) in return for pandering to Hariri’s injured pride and sense of ownership over Beirut. al-Akhbar reports that Hizballah convinced Aoun to drop his demand for 8 seats in district 1 by proposing forming a coalition list, bringing together pro-government and opposition candidates, to run in district 2!

That would leave 5 out of 19 seats to be acutally elected in Beirut and we still have a year to go. Given this riveting start, I cannot wait to see their electoral programs!

 

radwan al-sayyid rewrites history in a rant

Today, Radwan al-Sayyid has disgraced himself and his party with the things he said on air (Sound of Lebanon radio station).

In his attempt to bridge together a sectarian vision of Beirut, which delimits his world, and a national role, which he is supposed to fill as advisor to the Prime Minister, what he said was so riddled with contradictions that it would only make sense if you replace “Beirut” and “Lebanon” with “Sunni.”

Radwan blatantly rejects any calls for sharing the foregone votes in Beirut saying:

They said to us (…) ‘we the Shia and the Aounis have had our sectarian rights in purely Shiite and purely Christian areas and, you Sunnis, we want to share your areas, particularly Beirut.’ They say Beirut is for everyone, Beirut is for everyone, but not for its inhabitants [ie. Sunnis]. When they say it is for everyone, this means it is not for its inhabitants [i.e. Sunnis] (…) We will not allow them to divide Beirut in three. Beirut will remain a city for all Lebanese [i.e. Sunnis] and will remain unified [i.e. for the Sunnis].

But here comes the most disgraceful part:

The first Municipal elections in the East took place in Beirut in 1875. Now the Armenian who has nothing in Armenia wants a third of Beirut? How? I don’t understand anything of what is being said and I do not believe Hizballah wants to become a protector of ethnic and religious minorities.

Eh, 3ala mahlak la tifham, ya Dr. Radwan.

One, there were Armenians in Beirut before the first municipal elections – which, by the way, took place in 1878, not 1875. But it is understandable that a round number falls on the lighter side of a mind narrowed to the point of oblivion by sectarian and chauvinistic thought. In addition, most of the Armenians who came to Lebanon had never seen Armenia in their life. They escaped the massacres in present day Turkey, see, otherwise they would not be here. To most, if not all Armenians in Beirut today, Beirut is the only home they have ever known and their belonging to the city should not even be a subject of discussion by anyone, let alone by the Prime Minister’s advisor!

Two, what about your allies, Dr. Radwan? Your Christian and Druze allies. Do they figure anywhere in this vision of Beirut you like to dream about?

Three, Beirut is the capital of Lebanon. Before that, and since 1888, it was the capital of the Vilayet of Beirut. By definition, a capital of a country belongs to the entire population. But if you are so concerned about representing the inhabitants of Beirut, why did your party reject having Beirut as one electoral district with proportional representation, as has been suggested in Doha? And let us not open the can of worms, shall we, and discuss how the inhabitants of a city, born and raised in it, need to travel places to vote in parliamentary elections.

Four, since he has brought this upon himself, someone should tell Dr. Radwan that at the time of the first municipal elections in 1878, only 263 Sunnis were eligible to stand for elections compared to 461 Christians (see Jens Hanssen’s Fin de Siècle Beirut). How would you like it if someone used this against you and your sect, Dr. Radwan?

So, what is it, Radwan: you want to pack up and move into the present and keep whatever little integrity you have left, or do you want to travel down history lane and face the unpleasant facts?

 

divine interventions

Tattoo in Jabal Muhsin (source: al-akhbar)

Press conferences are now all the fad. They are slowly transforming into “halaqat dhikr” for the invocation of the divine.

Hassan Nasrallah’s political aide, Hassan al-Khalil, held a press conference yesterday. No, he did not declare a divine victory, but he besought God that sedition not move to Christian areas.

Aoun, who felt left out by the latest events, decided to hold his own press conference where he invoked the divine thrice:

I assure everyone that the danger to the [Christian] area is non-existant and illusory. We have an agreement with Hizballah from 2006 which will last until the end of time. If a bullet wanted to come from Dayiyah [southern suburb of Beirut] towards East Beirut, it will change its course, take a turn, and go elsewhere. So, do not fear.

أطمئن الجميع أن الخطر على المنطقة غير موجود ووهمي. نحن وحزب الله قمنا بتفاهم عام 2006 وسيدوم الى أبد الآبدين. الرصاصة إذا أرادت المجيء من الضاحية باتجاه الجهة الشرقية، ستغير مسارها وتكوّع وتروح لغير محل، فلا يخاف أحد

When asked if there were any arrangements with the Opposition to prevent clashes from spreading to Christian areas he answered:

There are angels not only in the heavens, but also on earth watching over so that the clashes do not move to Chrisitan areas.

هناك ملائكة ساهرون على الارض كي لا تنتقل هذه الاشتباكات الى المناطق المسيحية وليس فقط ملائكة في السماء

Before the cock crowed a fourth time, Talal Arslan (the politician previously known as prince), also held a press conference today to confirm that:

No one, not near nor far, wants to enter the houses of the sons [inhabitants] of the mountain and no one wants the surrender of the individual weapons in the possession of the sons of the mountain and in the possession of all Lebanese.

لا احد، لا من قريب ولا من بعيد، يريد الدخول الى بيوت ابناء الجبل ولا احد يريد تسليم السلاح الفردي الموجود بحوزة ابناء الجبل وبحوزة جميع اللبنانيين

That is the most valuable lesson to be learned from the events of the past week: the divine affirmation of the unalienable right of every Lebanese citizen to carry illegal arms. And is it any coincidence that the word for “gun” in Lebanese is “فرد” (individual)?