After the initial head start in the government formation process, the word now is that there will be no new government in Lebanon before the end of Ramadan (late September). Here are a few theories — each colored by a certain position in the political spectrum — being floated around by the Lebanese press on why Saad al-Hariri has so far failed to put together a government:

1. Michel Aoun is making impossible demands, such as demanding to have the Ministry of Interior and insisting that his nephew, Jubran Basil, continue in his current position as Minister of Telecommunications despite the fact that Basil was not elected into parliament. These impossible demands relate directly to Syria’s most recent attempt at gaining a foothold in the Lebanese arena. This attempt is also manifest in the Syrian insinuation that Saad al-Hariri should visit Syria before — as opposed to after — the formation of a Lebanese government. Hizballah’s silence can only be interpreted as tacit complicity. Moving forward is dependent on a new round of Saudi-Syrian negotiations.

2. It is less about Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and more about the regional order. Saudi Arabia and Syria are finding some trouble in their negotiation process. Those who ascribe to this theory can be split into two camps: (1) those who believe that Saudi Arabia is reacting to an all-too-rapid US-Syrian rapprochement and (2) those who believe that the US is pulling the reigns on the rapprochement between Syria and Saudi Arabia in order to get something out of it. Either way — Lebanon being a chip in the regional negotiations and all — this has come in the way of the formation of a new government. Moving forward is dependent on Saudi-Syrian-US negotiations.

3. Saudi Arabia and Syria have handed Lebanon the 15-10-5 government formula (these seats going to March 14, the opposition, and the president respectively), but Lebanese politicians are simply squabbling amongst themselves over the particular allocation of the various ministerial posts.

The not-so-surprising reelection of Nabih Berri as head of parliament yesterday reconfirmed the laws of gravity: whatever goes up, comes down. This law, it seems, keeps coming as a surprise to those firing bullets of celebration into the air. More surprising than the reelection of Berri, at least. Five Sixteen people were reported injured by the descent of bullets that had ascended into the air in joy – one of those, ironically, the technical director of NBN (Nabih Berri Network) who was in the vicinity of Berri’s residence in Ayn al-Tinah.

What I was not aware of, however, was another aspect of the law of gravity: it applies only to the inhabitants of Jemmayzah and Ashrafiyah. This according to one of our young and promising lawmakers, Nadim Gemayyel:

… some have insisted on expressing their joy with celebratory bullets, which filled with despair the hearts of citizens in Ashrafiyah and Jemmayzah, wounded during their movements on the streets and between schools.

… we show deep solidarity with the injured in Ashrafiyah and environs, hoping that the parties concerned would put under control these practices which are inherited from the days of the war and are not suitable for our present and our society’s outlook towards a better Lebanon.

My heart is already swelling with pride at this new generation leading our Lebanon towards a better future, with an outlook that goes beyond “the citizens of Ashrafiyah and Gemmayzah.” And in the spirit of stretching Lebanon’s history back to where we dare not look, here is a little reminder about revolverism from the archives.

Today, al-Akhbar released a transcript (with some omissions) of the closed meeting between Walid Junblat and the Druze sheikhs which had been previously leaked on youtube in April. The original leak offered a rare glimpse of the everyday politics of sectarianism in Lebanon. And while the leak might have been more sensational, today’s transcript contextualizes better Junblat’s aim in the meeting: convincing those present to work the Druze rank and file into accepting coexsitence with the Shi`a (read Hizballah).

Steps towards reconciliation between Junblat and Hizballah have been in the making since the Doha meeting this past summer. Junblat immediately issued several overtures which culminated in Na`im Qasim revealing Hizballah’s decision to open up to Walid Junblat and suggesting that a meeting between Junblat and Nasrallah is possible after — and probably also in light of — the elections. Junblat’s attempt at smoothing the Druze wrinkles of last May might very well be a preparation for such an eventuality.

What I find most interesting, however, is the argumentation method Junblat used to convince those present of helping him with his goal: reconciliation or bloodshed. Pursuant to his summary of “we have the sea, we have Israel, and we have Syria,” he said:

ولما كانت الحرب، كنت أطلب الذخيرة، كان حافظ الأسد يلبّي طلبي سريعاً (الواحد بدو يذكر المساوئ والمحاسن) كانت قوافل الذخيرة تأتي من جديدة يابوس حتى حمّانا… صحيح خضنا الحرب، لكن اليوم ماذا أفعل؟ من أين أحصل على الذخيرة؟ من البحر؟ أو من إسرائيل؟ لا، من إسرائيل لا…

When there was [civil] war, I used to ask for munitions and Hafiz al-Asad would swiftly fulfill my request (one has to remember both the good and the bad characteristics). Caravans of munitions used to come from Jdaydit Yabus to Hammana. It is true we went to war, but what do I do today? Where do I get munitions from? From the sea? Or from Israel? No, not form Israel…

A structurally similar line of “alliance with Hizballah or bust” was forwarded during the “debate” between Ibrahim Kanaan and Sami Gemayel on Kalam al-Nas last Sunday (if you can stand 2+ hours of shouting, you can watch it here). Responding to Gemayel’s (read, Kataeb’s) one trick pony of “the state über alles” and to the accusation that the Free Patriotic Movement is providing cover for Hizballah’s project for Islamicizing Lebanon, Kanaan responded that the alternative to coming to an understanding with Hizballah would be “committing suicide” (towards the end the episode).

Earlier in the Kalam al-Nas debate (a cross between a cockfight and a bad domestic argument), Kanaan accused Gemayel’s party of waging “a campaign of fear” when it comes to Hizballah (عم بتخوفوا الناس). That much is obvious. From billboards, to slogans, to speeches… capitalizing on the events of May 7th has pretty much been March 14th ticket this electoral campaign. But one has to ask oneself, are not alliances and rapprochements with Hizballah, when framed as Junblat and Kanaan frame them, also campaigns of fear? Hizballah, it seems to me, can be a very useful and flexible tool.

A couple of days ago, Khaled Saghiyah’s article in al-Akhbar questioned — very politely and very tactfully — Hassan Nasrallah’s description of the 7th of May (2008)  as a “glorious day for the resistance.” Saghiyah does not split hairs on the by now well-rehearsed argument that Hizballah and its allies’ swooping down on Beirut was a necessary evil. Instead, he appeals to the politician in Nasrallah — rather than the military strategist — asking whether calling May 7th a glorious day might be a tad insensitive in a country such as Lebanon:

Not everything can be measured in terms of military cost. May 7th may have cut short a road to a longer civil war and even more victims, but the politician who wants to affirm his ability to rule the country cannot justify civic violence (even if he regards it as necessary) by gloating and glorifying. He does it, rather, with sadness and pain.

Saghiyah has hit the nail on the head with this one. He pin-points the indefensible in Nasrallah’s logic — i.e. indefensible in the terms and rhetoric that Nasrallah has set for himself. At a time of extreme polarization, he also manages to frame what amounts to a “criticism from within,” a very rare creature these days.

Saghiyah points explicitly to the polarization generated by the discourse on both sides and suggests that it might have been a factor in the increased spying activity for Israel. A friend of mine recently remarked on the effect this polarization has had over the past few years on the attitude of some Amal members/friends. It used to be, according to this friend, that these individuals took great care to differentiate themselves from what they viewed as Hizballah’s silly Islamism. Their worn-out mantel of “secularism” has been cast. Identifying today proudly as “matawilah” and drunk on the spoils of that glorious day, they proclaim their readiness to “take over” Beirut once and for all.

Last week, the Free Patriotic Movement unveiled its electoral program: Towards the Third Republic… (pdf). Aoun has discussed this concept at least as far back as 2001. But the Free Patriotic Movement has brilliantly capitalized on it for this electoral campaign. A while back, Ibrahim Kanaan elaborated in an interview with al-Akhbar on the three republics:

1st: the weak, post-independence republic. Characterized by the political classes’ divisions and thus inability “to protect Lebanon from regional forces.”

2nd: the corrupt, post-Taef republic. The Taef, again according to Kanaan, solved the first republic problem by inserting the need for an external valve, Syria. More importantly, this republic was corrupt and the cause behind the national debt.

3rd: the projected, FPM third republic. Characterized by a strong state, in contrast to the 1st, and a transparent and accountable system of governance, in contrast to the 2nd. Their impressive electoral program elaborates on how the party aims to achieve this vision.

There is much, much to say about the concept of the third republic – both its obvious ingeniousness and its less obvious assumptions – but I wanted to share a few things that struck me regarding its overall periodization.

First, any periodization is, of course, neither self-obvious nor given and, more often than not, serves a specific version of history. In this instance, FPM’s periodization builds on an existing one. It orchestrates history as a series of movements culminating in an interpretation of the present as a moment of crisis resulting from weakness and corruption. Even more so, with its emphasis on a stable, almost final epoch — “the third republic is stable” (see image) — this version of history borders on the messianic. The element of messianism is further buttressed by a major backbone of the electoral campaign deriving from the new testament verse ”Fal yakun kalamukum na`am, na`am, la, la” (“But let your words be yes, yes, and no, no; for anything which adds to these is deception.” Matthew 5:34-37). As if to further stress this point, in the al-Akhbar interview Kannan uses the expression “rusul al-jumhuriyah al-thalithah” (apostles of the third republic) to describe the party.

Second, this periodization is also informed by a derivative version of history, one that references the history of France, particularly the longest and first stable republic after a century of upheavals, la Troisième République. A Rajeh al-Khouri Op-Ed in al-Nahar asks: why is the third republic stable? The answer is simple: because la Troisième République was stable. But this is not merely a matter of translation. Together with the “Sois belle et vote” campaign advertisement and the new testament references, this leaves little doubt as to what audience will not only understand, but, more importantly, react to this as an “appellation,” to borrow from Althusser — i.e. recognizing themselves in an external projection that is in fact a barely disguised reflection of their inner conditioning. The function this performs — whether purposefully or not, whether successfully or not — is the reproduction of ideology.

There is one last point to the periodization in question, and that is the less obvious de facto acceptance of a specific version of Lebanon’s first republic. The problem with this Lebanon, according to FPM’s vision, is not its corruption, not its social and economic inequalities, not its marginalization of a large segment of its population. Although the electoral program diagnoses some problems that can be traced back to the first republic (rural neglect, for example), discursively, problems of corruption, bad management, and neglect are primarily stressed in relation to the post-Taef (read, Hariri) period. The main problem with the “golden period” of Lebanon’s pre-civil war history is, according to the third republic vision, primarily the weakness of the state. As such, whereas the FPM vision of history upon which “the third republic” builds diverges only in the more recent past from the “Maronite” history shared by its adversaries, it clashes dramatically with that of its allies.

• In the wake of Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s attack on Iran and the Shi`i expansionist threat it poses to Sunni Islam, rhetoric against Hizballah, Iran, and the Shi`a in general found new wind. Only this time, Salafi websites are using the writings of Christian kuffar to argue their finer points.

• Nawwaf Musawi, Hizballah international relations officer, attacked David Miliband for calling Hizballah’s militant arm terrorist, asking whether De Gaulle’s resistance from Britain was also terrorism, as Nazi propaganda called it back then. Musawi further stressed his point by likening Miliband’s characterization to Goebbel’s Nazi propaganda.

• With its transformation from financial to economic, the crisis finally made an entry to the Lebanese market… through the jewelry sector. Demand has apparently decreased by 50% [Note: maybe this means it is approaching normal]. While a certain class of people with investments abroad is obviously suffering over jewelry, the economy as a whole is now bracing for an upcoming world-wide recession.

• The Lebanese national debt is now at $48,414,000,000, or about 196.47% of the GDP. Have a nice day.

A musalahah (reconciliation) has been concluded in Tripoli, similar to the musalahah in Taalbaya and Saadnayil earlier this summer, only this one involved bigger fish. To those less familiar with Lebanese political jargon, musalahah is the younger sister of the “no winners, no losers” (لا غالب ولا مغلوب) formula. Both are invitations to pretending that nothing happened. It is very telling that although they were invited to the musalahah, the fighters on the Tibbaneh side were not responsive.

But something else caught my eye. Something that would have been so funny had it not been equally tragic:

وسجل على هامش توقيع الوثيقة تحفظ النائب السابق علي عيد على توقيع الوثيقة لسبيين: الأول ورود اسم النائب بدر ونوس قبله، ما عدّه عدم حفظ اللياقات والمواقع، والثاني طلبه إيراد عبارة ممثل الطائفة العلوية مقابل اسمه، ما استدعى تدخلاً من الحريري ومن النائب السابق أحمد حبوس، وتأكيد الحريري لعيد أنه مستعد لتدوين العبارة بخط يده إذا كان الأمر يحل المشكلة، وقد أدى ذلك إلى تجاوز أزمة عدّها البعض شكلية وكادت تنسف الجهود دفعة واحدة

Ex-member of Parliament Ali Eid Ali’s two reservations were noted in the margins of the document [of reconciliation]: First, that the name of parliamentarian Badr Wannus comes before his own, which he considered a breach of etiquette and ranking, and, second, his request to add “representative of the Allawi sect” before his name. This necessitated an intervention from Hariri and ex-member of parliament Ahmad Habus and Hariri stressed that he is ready to write the phrase in his own handwriting if it solves the problem. The crisis, which some considered formal, passed after it almost sabotaged the efforts [at reconciliation] altogether.

The inferiority complex of this petty za`im of a minor minority is only the mirror image of the overblown self-confidence of the other za`im of a larger minority. This specific mix of pathos, machos, and wackos is just too much.

I spent summer in Beirut, in the smog and the racket, between emotional extremes, as Lebanon can only be lived. It struck me one day when I was walking down the street: I am not seeing smiling faces. I am not hearing laughs. All I saw around me were drawn faces, that despite the fireworks flaring the sky and fraying our nerves on a nightly basis.

Everyone knew that the joy after the Doha agreement was only temporary. When clashes erupted in Beka` and then in the north, the reaction in Beirut was one of fear followed closely by one of nonchalance. When the government was formed, the nonchalance persisted. It persisted through the cynical love fest that came nipping at its heels. George Adwan welcoming the freed prisoners at the airport??? Hizballah giving the honor of an official welcome for its heroes to those who want it destroyed??? Junblat talking about Palestine, Arabism, and resistance (again???)??? It was all a replay of a bad nightmare. One is left at a complete loss. What is more nauseating: when our leaders agree or when they do not agree?

Granted, Hizballah achieved something. Some people asked if the price was worth it, pointing out the number of deaths, the war, the destruction. All to free someone who, for all we know, is a child murderer. But most people did not ask that question because it is irrelevant. The prison break and the theatrical talk that ensued on stage was nothing but a charade in bad taste. Samir Quntar was an excuse, all the better because he is not Shiite. And we all know that chances are he will be running for elections, not crawling back to Jerusalem (will he be sidelined like other freed prisoners who tried to challenge Hizballah’s electoral dominance in the south?).

Samir Quntar has been reading the news in prison, however, and he knows he can say whatever he wants and no one will hold him accountable. Everyone does it, after all. In Lebanon, no one is ever held accountable for their verbal gymnastics. So, kiss George Adwan on the cheek and onward to Jerusalem!

Tattoo in Jabal Muhsin (source: al-akhbar)

Press conferences are now all the fad. They are slowly transforming into “halaqat dhikr” for the invocation of the divine.

Hassan Nasrallah’s political aide, Hassan al-Khalil, held a press conference yesterday. No, he did not declare a divine victory, but he besought God that sedition not move to Christian areas.

Aoun, who felt left out by the latest events, decided to hold his own press conference where he invoked the divine thrice:

I assure everyone that the danger to the [Christian] area is non-existant and illusory. We have an agreement with Hizballah from 2006 which will last until the end of time. If a bullet wanted to come from Dayiyah [southern suburb of Beirut] towards East Beirut, it will change its course, take a turn, and go elsewhere. So, do not fear.

أطمئن الجميع أن الخطر على المنطقة غير موجود ووهمي. نحن وحزب الله قمنا بتفاهم عام 2006 وسيدوم الى أبد الآبدين. الرصاصة إذا أرادت المجيء من الضاحية باتجاه الجهة الشرقية، ستغير مسارها وتكوّع وتروح لغير محل، فلا يخاف أحد

When asked if there were any arrangements with the Opposition to prevent clashes from spreading to Christian areas he answered:

There are angels not only in the heavens, but also on earth watching over so that the clashes do not move to Chrisitan areas.

هناك ملائكة ساهرون على الارض كي لا تنتقل هذه الاشتباكات الى المناطق المسيحية وليس فقط ملائكة في السماء

Before the cock crowed a fourth time, Talal Arslan (the politician previously known as prince), also held a press conference today to confirm that:

No one, not near nor far, wants to enter the houses of the sons [inhabitants] of the mountain and no one wants the surrender of the individual weapons in the possession of the sons of the mountain and in the possession of all Lebanese.

لا احد، لا من قريب ولا من بعيد، يريد الدخول الى بيوت ابناء الجبل ولا احد يريد تسليم السلاح الفردي الموجود بحوزة ابناء الجبل وبحوزة جميع اللبنانيين

That is the most valuable lesson to be learned from the events of the past week: the divine affirmation of the unalienable right of every Lebanese citizen to carry illegal arms. And is it any coincidence that the word for “gun” in Lebanese is “فرد” (individual)?

The economic policies of successive governments in Lebanon have focused on developing the centers at the expense of the peripheries, therefore weakening the central authority’s presence and strengthening the role that sectarian parties play in regions like Akkar, the South, and the Hermel. The latest events show, once again, how these conditions create pockets of poverty and misery prone to sectarian mobilization in times of crisis.

Benefiting from the high rate of unemployment in the mostly Sunni north, the Sunni Future Movement has managed to lure young men to the capital with the promise of work for security companies. I would not trust al-Manar’s reporting on this, but there are other sources. Ras Beirut residents have also witnessed how a large building on Sidani Street, between Shamali Stores and the ex-location of the Ministry of Economy, turned over the past few months into housing for young men from the north. This building was one of the flash points during the recent clashes around Hamra.

In a similar vein, Shiite Hizballah feeds on the economic situation to draw swathes of historically marginalized Shiites into its folds. It is no secret either that the party rides the bandwagon of labor demands to serve its own ends, often at the expense of sabotaging a good cause, as it did with the demonstration of May 7th.

When Hizballah first entered parliamentary politics in the 1990’s, some believed they had found an alley in the fight against the sectarian system and a champion for the Shia. Indeed, economic redistribution and the abolishment of political sectarianism were focal points in the party’s electoral program of 1996.

Hizballah, however, has done nothing by way of achieving these goals, for despite the rhetoric of “justice and equality,” the party is just as invested in the sectarian, clientelist system as the others. In his press conference of May 8th, Hassan Nasrallah “places the dots on the letters” regarding this point:

We do not propose any change in the makeup of the Lebanese system, in the makeup of authority, and some people accuse us because of this position. We are with the Taef agreement and with the implementation of the Taef agreement (…) If there is a general Lebanese will towards modification [of the political system], in the end this belongs to a general Lebanese will. But we, as a group, do we have propositions for adjustment or want to impose adjustments [to the political system] on the Lebanese? No. Thus, we do not have any suggestion whatsoever for change in the positions of authority, not with regards to the position of president, prime minister, or any other positions.

نحن بالنسبة لنا لا نطرح اي تغيير في تركيبة النظام في لبنان، في تركيبة السلطة، وبعض الناس بيتهمونا لان نحن موقفنا هيك، ونحن مع اتفاق الطائف، تنفيذ اتفاق الطائف (…) اذا في ارادة لبنانية عامة بدها تعدل، بالنهاية هيدا صار تابع لارادة لبنانية عامة. لكن نحن كفريق انو عنا طرح تعديل وبدنا نفرض تعديلات علی اللبنانيين، لا. بالتالي نحن ما عنا اي تغيير او طرح يرتبط بمواقع السلطة علی الاطلاق، لا برئاسة الجمهورية، ولا برئاسة الحكومة ولا ببقية المواقع

Myth has it that Nasrallah is a clear and honest man. That, then, should put any doubts to rest.

That is how Walid Jumblat resolved the issue in his press conference last night, by recognizing that the telecommuncations network is important to the work of “the resistance,” as he now calls Hizballah. You can hear the entire press conference at elnashra (Note: To Jumblat, as to his father before him, the mountain is a sensitive spot, and it is very obvious in this press conference.)

Beirut and the mountain have quitened down, so has the north after a rough night. Hizballah has opened Pandora’x box and let slip out all the monstrosities of war. They have apparently paid a gruesome price for it too, as two of their fighters have been knived and their bodies mutilated by Jumblat’s men (he assumed full responsibility for that – if true – in the press conference).

Now Wi’am Wahhab is out spewing menacing statements and the SSNP has issued an open threat to Hariri and Sanioura accusing their followers of gruesome acts in Halba (hat tip Tantalus). The open letter warns that if the perpetrators are not handed over, Hariri and Sanioura will be held personally accountable, regardless of any wider political settlement in Lebanon.

You can ask Riad al-Solh and Bashir al-Jumayyil. The sentence of the people was carried out against them by everyday SSNP members and without the need for a decision from the central party apparatus.

Remarkable how easily we slip back into old habits. How easy is it to slip out?

On May 7, and after the longest ministerial session in Lebanon’s history, the government took the descision to remove head of airport security, Brigadier General Wafiq Shuqayr, from his position and to declare Hizballah’s communications network “illegal and constitutional.” Considering this a declaration of war, Hizballah led several of the opposition parties in a strategic military action meant to pressure the government to backtrack, cutting off the capital and placing it under the military control of the opposition.

As the death toll rises and the clashes now spread to the north and the mountains, the outcome remains uncertain. Throughout these events, the usual stream of words continues, with accusations and counter accusations, speeches and counter speeches, interviews and counter interviews. The avid news reader in Lebanon is by now used to the illogical logic of the sectarian nation that refuses to see itself for what it is. Following are a few snapshots from its most eloquent orators.

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In his press conference on May 8, Hassan Nasrallah defended the military actions of the party and its allies in the streets of Beirut saying:

We have not used and will not use weapons inside [Lebanon]… But weapons will be used to defend weapons against anyone.

نحن لم نستخدم ولن نستخدم السلاح في الداخل… ولكن السلاح سيُستخدم للدفاع عن السلاح في وجه اي كان

In other words, the offense was in self defense. It is true, the longer the conflict lasts, the more you resemble your most bitter of enemies. And I am not referring to the pro-government coalition.

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After the Ma`rab meeting of May 9, Samir Geagea, who is fond of rewriting history, sent a salute to Walid Jumblat “who resisted the Syrians for 28 years.” He further elaborated on this new version of history by recalling the siege of Beirut in 1982:

Beirut did not fall under Israeli invasion, and it will not fall today.

So, while Jumblat was resisting the Syrians for 28 years, Geagea was defending Beirut from the Israelis. But of course, we all knew that.

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If Geagea is the nation’s historian, Walid Jumblat is the hypnotist. Yesterday he expressed bewilderment at Hizballah’s overblown reaction to the government’s decision to “transfer” an officer. Only last week, the same Jumblat was whipping up fears of a major operation at the airport and linking it to Hizballah’s infiltration of airport security. His bewilderment did not extend far enough, however, to suggest that the decision be backtracked. It is, according to him after all, only a transfer.