As most followers of all things Lebanese know, a unity government headed by Saad Hariri has been formed after five months of… well, formation. Ziad Baroud is going to retain his position as Minister of Interior (president’s share) and that is good news. But there is even better news: The Free Patriotic Movement has chosen no other than economist, activist, and intellectual Sharbil Nahhas for the post of Minister of Telecommunications. To those of you not familiar with Sharbil Nahhas, his website (trilingual) gives a good idea of his qualifications. Nahhas is a reformer in spirit with a fundamental critique and understanding of our sectarian system. Over the past two decades, Nahhas has put together several proposals, such as a strategy for social development and a law proposal for a pension scheme, that, needless to say, never made it through the system. As the inside man, there is reason to hope a little.

Other than Baroud and Nahhas, there are actually some good choices in this makeup (by “good” I mean people who are actually into “governing” while in government). Rayya Haffar al-Hassan (Future Movement) came in as first Lebanese female minister of Finance ever and one of two women in the unity government. No fundamental change is going to come from these quarters. She has been schooled by Hariri and Sanioura and, as she herself has declared, she intends to follow similar financial policies. But to be realistic, she is competent and one can hope this will reflect on the ever ballooning public debt. Fadi Abboud (FPM, tourism) and Hassan Mnaymnah (Future Movement, education) are also promising choices. As for Amal, Hizballah, and Junblat, they have mostly exhibited characteristic lack of creativity in their choice of ministers.

There has also been a lot of focus in the media on Hariri’s snub to the Kataeb. The Gemayyel party has been dealt what is regarded in Lebanon as a third rate ministry, namely Social Affairs. There are two things to note here. The first is that far from being a shock, this comes as the culmination of the problems Kataeb has been having with March 14, not just Hariri. The second point is summarized succinctly by Khaled Saghiyah in today’s al-Akhbar: “The government to Hariri is like the weapons to Hizballah; you can support it as an ally but you cannot partake of it.”

Next on the agenda, a Hariri pilgrimage to Damascus to be followed by a Junblat chaser.

For some reason, some native intellectuals insist on adopting the reductionist model of backwardness vs. progress to explain politics in Lebanon today. The latest incarnation is an op-ed by Hazim Saghiyah (not to be confused with the nephew, Khalid) published in Meow Lebanon. Referring to an electoral speech delivered by Jubran Basil, Saghiyah explains:

This distinction between “the materialism of the West” and “the spiritualism of the East” is not new, nor is it monopolized by the Lebanese. What is new is that it is now emanating from a political party [the Free Patriotic Movement] that continuously expresses its attachment to modernity and to “reform and change.” But Hizballah has already, in its last electoral program, announced “fighting vice” as one of its points [...]

[...] There are therefore, regardless of the election and its results and away from politics in its daily and common conception, signs of a cultural alliance, one might say, between the two parties of Mar Mkhayel [signatories of the memorandum of understanding]. And the direct enemy of this alliance is: freedom and progress.

For an intellectual, Saghiyah is incredibly ignorant of Middle Eastern intellectual history. The distinction between the materiality of the West and the spirituality and values of the East is not meeting its modernist and reformist counterpart for the first time. It is precisely the product of a modern condition and a modern reorganization of knowledge that attempted to shore up and define a disempowered “East” against a politically, economically, and militarily powerful “West.” A counter-Orientalism, if you will, belonging to the time of al-nahdah (late 19th century Arab “renaissance”).

But what is more interesting is the political expediency to Saghiyhah’s intellectual musings. By branding the Free Patriotic Movement and Hizballah as the darkest relics of the past, their opponents emerge as champions of “freedom and progress.” On what he means by that, he explains: “[...] the most important foundations and characteristics of Lebanon, as in opening up to the Arab and western worlds, as well as in its economy and prosperity.” When defined in this truncated manner, one is tempted to follow up with the conclusion that Gulf states are beacons of freedom and progress!

This watered down definition eschews — perhaps unwittingly — more common and fundamental aspects of “freedom and progress” such as democratic practices and representation, freedom of the press and the media, a redistribution of economic opportunities, a structure of rights and duties, etc… etc… Naturally so, because if Saghiyah were to highlight these instead, one would be hard pressed to find a place for March 14 in their midst. But the only way to grant March 14 the cultural legitimacy and civilizational mission that it claims for itself — without questioning it or questioning the regional power structure behind it — is to cast its opponents as partners in an anti-modern, cultural alliance.

Though these cultural claims to civilization are not new in Lebanon, they have persisted over the past few years in a very bare and highly politicized form. Today, however, there were hints in the Lebanese media of a possible reshuffling of alliances that is to take place in the coming weeks. If this reshuffling were indeed to happen, it would be interesting to watch where leftists-turned-liberals such as Hazim Saghiyah will turn to next.

In case you are still wondering why exactly Minister of Interior, Ziad Baroud’s proposal for pre-printed ballots was vehemently opposed by Amal, Hizballah, the Lebanese Forces, and the Future Movement:

What happens is that the campaign machines themselves print a list of candidates that they want you to put in the ballot box, and distribute it. That sounds harmless, but it’s the key device to track votes. Most people vote in villages, where you have rarely more than 2,000 voters, who are further subdivided by sect and by family register numbers. So if in a given voting room you have ten major families, they will distribute ten different versions of the same list to those families — different in font, name order, etc. During vote count, the election monitors of the various candidates inspect any single ballot paper, and they track exactly how many copies of what version ended up in the box. And after the elections, they may come to the head of that family and tell him: hey — we promised you to pay the tuition for your nephew, we settled your cousin’s hospital bill — why didn’t you guys vote for us?

There is another ingenious device to insure people vote the way they are supposed to or paid to: the “rent-an-ID” method. Basically, you are paid a certain sum of money in return for giving up your national identity card until election day. Then, on the appointed day, you are met by a representative who hands you your ID and a ballot, making sure you drop the latter “as is” (mitil/zayy ma hiyyi).

Just when you thought you had seen the last of him, here he goes again. With elections in Lebanon and Iran within a week of each other, why not reflect on democracy:

There are rumors about large amounts of Saudi money floating in to support the victorious March 14 coalition, but so what? Hezbollah gets at least $200 million a year from Iran. It is striking that the losers are not crying foul; they too agree the election was fundamentally fair.

As long as everyone agrees that foreign interference and ridiculous amounts of money being thrown around are the order of the day, it must be free and fair elections. Just another day in the life of Elliot Abrams. Read all about it.

With Amal and Hizballah reaffirming their presence in their districts and Sulayman Franjiyah reconsolidating his fiefdom in Zgharta, the biggest losers in these elections have been the Free Patriotic Movement. Though they still represent a considerable chunk of the Christians, the shock of the decline since 2005 against all expectations and predictions is still reverberating.

Critiques of “what went wrong” abound, and Khalid Saghiyah rises to the occassion again with a sharp one. He criticizes ongoing attempts to justify the electoral loss, including the appeal to the popular vote, stressing instead the need for introspection on several levels: the sectarian discourse, the divisive electoral law, and the “glorious day” (May 7th, 2008).

But he also nails down other blunders:

• Hizballah’s resignation when it comes to its Sunni allies, who have been left to their own devices. Hizballah “bet instead on the Christian horse” leaving the Sunnis feeling besieged.
• The inability to transform the memorandum of understanding from an “alliance” into an “understanding” over common political and national grounds, leaving a glaring gap between “the public” of Hizballah and that of the Free Patriotic Movement.
• The “anthem against corruption” remained sensational and vague. He points out that while Aoun’s discourse on corruption might “tickle the feelings” of the middle class, it is out of tune with the popular classes that are dependent on the channels of corruption and clientalism. I think this observation can also be used to critique the approach of idealist, typically middle class alternatives for governance — such as secularization, centralization, etc — which ignore the realities on the ground, be those engendered by choice or lack of it.
• The opposition’s inability to concretize its slogan of “building the strong, capable, and just state.” In fact, when it came to ministerial appointments, the selection of electoral candidates, and the paucity of their political programs, the opposition repeated the mistakes of the governmental majority.

It is one thing to try and understand vote composition along the lines of various groups, be they defined by gender, social class, age etc. And in Lebanon of course, sect becomes the overriding category. But to take this to the level of judging whether someone was voted in with the “right” votes or not is a dangerous game of numbers. That the balance was tipped by the Shiite vote in favor of the Free Patriotic Movement in Byblos (which, it turns out, is not even accurate given the margin of ca. 8,000 votes) and Baabda or by the Sunni vote in favor of March 14 in Zahleh, does that make it less legitimate? Even in a thoroughly sectarian system such as ours, a citizen of a non-majority sect in a certain district is still represented — on a practical level, at least — by the parliamentarians from that district. Instead, s/he is being treated like a resident alien with voting rights. I am surprised no one has suggested population transfers yet.

But it does not stop here. Hints of the “outside” vote of the Armenians were not absent from this electoral battle either. Harping on the Greek Orthodox tendon of Ashrafiyah was also an electoral strategy — and a successful one by the looks of it. Where does it stop? Is a Greek Orthodox vote cast in Matn the “right” one? Is a Maronite vote cast in Ashrafiyah the “right” one? If my mother is Greek Orthodox Lebanese and my father a Shiite Iraqi and I have been naturalized in 1995 as Shiite, but have been living in France since 1996 with my Maronite husband and came back to vote for Aoun in Byblos, would that make mine a “right” vote? I wonder.

An "invalid" ballot: "Shit on you and on these elections. 'Banana republic.' Signed: A decent citizen." (Source: www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/140198)

Since I have nothing to do but write a dissertation, I spent last night trying to make some sense of the numerical aspects of the elections. This year, thanks to Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud, blank votes were counted separately and not together with invalid votes. This went down well with eleven thousand one hundred and ninety-seven voters, or 0.82% of cast ballots (Sean has a table with the breakdown of blank votes per district). It might not seem much, but one has to keep in mind the voting conditions at various polling stations and that this is the first time a distinction between “blank” and “invalid” votes is implemented. Given that in Lebanese elections no one is ever sure how many of the eligible voters are actually alive or around, abstaining from the vote in protest might be misinterpreted as, well, death. That is why I think the blank vote is important — it not only protests the lack of choices, but it also asserts a presence, both physical and political.

My other perfect excuse for procrastination was “the popular vote.” Hassan Nasrallah brought it up in his speech last night when commenting on the election results and Al of Ex Oriente Lux picks up on this issue. Nasrallah said the opposition probably has the popular vote and that he will leave it to the professionals to figure it out. According to a study cited by al-Akhbar (bottom of the page), the opposition received 54.5% of the popular vote, whereas the ruling coalition received 45.5%. I find it funny that the total adds up to 100%. As far as I know, we have not succumbed to the two-party system yet and there was a visible amount of votes cast for people not running on either lists, especially in Hizballah and Amal’s backyards.

Now I am no professional, but here are the numbers I got when, instead of taking the voters as blocks of with or against, I added the total number of votes cast for the total number of candidates in three categories: opposition 50.4%, ruling coalition 46%, and other 3.6%. I only did the numbers once and I might have missed an affiliated independent or two, but not any with a considerable number of votes attached.

These numbers are, of course, distorted on many levels, one of the main distortions being the opposition within Sunni and Shia turfs. This is particularly significant in majority Shia areas where the ruling coalition presence is weak, the “existential” confrontation is low priority, and the challenge comes from friendly quarters. Such was the case in Baalbak-Hermel and Hasbayya-Marji`yun where opposition competitors received some 10% of the vote.

As Ibrahim al-Amin points out in the al-Akhbar article linked to above, had there been a system of proportional representation, a bloc representing a substantial number of the Shia would most likely emerge. Which is why, all calls to the contrary notwithstanding, Hizballah has no interest in improving Shia representation — and I have posted on this before. That is why I find that Hassan Nasrallah’s passing comment on the popular vote has little to do with rights or justice. I see it instead as a performative utterance that indulges the feelings of underrepresentation that the Shia (rightfully) have and tickles the demographic fear the rest suffer from. All the while papering over the more complex realities that assure the indefinite continuation of the status quo.

The relatively smooth elections were followed by an eventless celebration of a March 14 and allies win by a clear margin. Some shooting incidents have been reported today, but nothing out of the “ordinary” so far. Anyone attempting to explain the results of this election in simplistic terms or to attribute it to declarations by Joe Biden or Jeffrey Feltman will have a hard time reconciling the larger picture with the nitty gritty of political life in Lebanon. As is always the case with Lebanese politics, the devil is in the details.

Back in 2005, March 14 and allies won 72 of the 128 seats, Hizballah/Amal and allies won 35, and the Free Patriotic Movement won 14. In terms of overall numbers, there is not much change this year. There are some minor changes in the composition. For example, Aoun got a free ride in Jizzin this time where he swept all three seats at Nabih Berri’s expense. Such shifts notwithstanding, talk of the incredible retreat in Aoun’s popularity since 2005 are exaggerated. With his allies, he still retains the largest Christian bloc in parliament despite the fact that the seats were won by narrower margins than in 2005. But this has to be seen in light of the immense wave of popularity Aoun rode upon his return from France and which four years of Lebanese politics are enough to squander… for anyone.

The real blow for the opposition, particularly the Free Patriotic Movement, was that they expected to garner more seats under the new, more representative law. Since Hizballah and Amal’s wins in largely homogenous districts were guaranteed, the burden was on Aoun to carry out the victory in majority Christian areas. What happened, in a sense, was that instead of favoring the FPM, the new electoral law magnified the political divisions within Christian communities and reproduced them on an ever smaller scale. The dramatic differences in voting patterns from one Christian village to another is evidence of this.

Aoun did deliver in Baabda (6-0), Kisirwan (5-0), Matn (6-2), and Byblos (3-0) — this despite Michel al-Murr migrating to March 14th in Matn and president Michel Sulayman’s last minute withdrawal of his candidate in Byblos to the benefit of March 14th. But the seats gained in these districts were lost in Zahleh (0-7), Batroun (0-2), and Beirut 1 (0-5). The tenacious “Muslim” vote was not absent from these battles, though, with the Shiite vote in Baabda and Byblos and the Sunni in Zahleh and Kurah influencing the final results. Anger at Hizballah in Batroun probably also played a hand in the ignominious defeat of incumbent minister of telecommunications and Aoun’s son-in-law, Jubran Basil (the soldier who died when Hizballah shot down the Lebanese army helicopter last summer was from Batroun).

So, we are back to the status quo that existed after the alliance between Hizballah and March 14th broke down in 2005. This happens to the relief of many, perhaps even Hizballah who were quick to concede defeat last night. But the pre-Doha status quo carries with it the dangers that have engulfed Lebanon the past four years. Where the different parties will go with the results of the elections depends on the government formation process and — to zoom back out again — on regional developments. Surprises and reshuffles of the kind that followed the 2005 elections are not to be ruled out completely. Not yet.

Addendum 1 (14:55 Beirut time): Talk about striking while the iron is hot. Muhammad Raad (Hizballah MP) assured AFP that the crisis will continue unless the majority “changes its behavior.” He listed basic principles the majority should abide by, first among them is leaving Hizballah’s weapons alone, another is to grant either guarantees or a blocking third in government.

Addendum 2 (15:14 Beirut time): Official results of Lebanese elections 2009 on the Ministry of Interior website (in Arabic).

The defining feature of these elections, both in Lebanon and abroad, has been the battle between the opposition and the government coalition. While seats in areas such as Beirut 3, Tripoli, South, and Beqa`-Hermel are mostly spoken for, real electoral battles are being waged in majority Christian areas between the Free Patriotic Movement and Christian parties under the March 14 umbrella. There are, however, other interesting flashpoints that go beyond the opposition/loyalists battle. Here are a few:

Beirut 3: The opposition list does not include either Hizballah or Amal, but rather a wide array of candidates from the leftist Harakat al-Sha`b to Sunni Beiruti families sidelined by Hariri (eg. `Itani). Although the seats are almost guaranteed to Sa`d al-Hariri, “almost” is the keyword. The opposition list’s ambition is to demonstrate that Beirut does not “belong” to Hariri and winning only one seat would make the point (Hariri battled down to the last seat in Beirut during the negotiations in Doha last summer). The Shiite vote alone is not enough for this, the opposition list would also need a high turn out (since the end of the civil war, the highest in what constitutes this district today is 24%).

`Akkar: There are several factors to keep in mind with respect to `Akkar. The feeling among the Sunnis of being let down after May 7th of last year and al-Mustaqbal’s neglect of the Wadi Khalid clans are first among them. Then there are also the Christians of `Akkar, whose vote, given the first sentiment, might end up having an impact. Though this does not really go beyond the broad guidelines of opposition vs. March 14, the results in this district would be very indicative of the position Sa`d Hariri now occupies among the Sunnis of the north. This is especially significant given the battle in Sidon, another Mustaqbal backyard, between Bahiya Hariri and Fuad Sanioura, on the one hand, and the Usama Sa`d and Abdel Rahman Bazzi coalition on the other.

West Biqa`-Rashayya: The Communist Party, running on the single-issue platform of proportional representation, is fielding five candidates this year and, barring surprises, none of them stand a chance. CP candidates Sam`an Laqqis (Kurah) and Faruq Dahrouj (West Biqa`) have insisted on running despite opposition pressure to withdraw. Dahrouj has particularly faced a lot of pressure, including some say Syrian, to move his candidacy to Zahle for the benefit of Abdul Rahim Murad. Getting one or two candidates on board is important for the opposition due to the symbolic value this district has for traditional allies of Syria. It would therefore be significant if Dahrouj manages to get enough votes to sabotage the opposition.

Marji`yun-Hasbayya: It would also be interesting to keep an eye on Sa`dallah Mazra`ani of the Communist Party to see how many votes the resistance-friendly left will be able to garner in Hizballah/Amal playground this time round. Though the Communist Party denies it, it seems there were attempts to reach some sort of deal with the opposition when the lists were being put together, but the party was shoved aside by Hizballah — which has been consistent in its aversion to leftist candidates in the past.

Granted, none of this constitutes much challenge to the main antagonists, yet the results can serve as an indication of the sway they have over their electorate. While no one can claim the Christian vote and no one can challenge the Shiite, it is mostly Sa`d al-Hariri’s credentials that are being put to the test after the carte blanche he was given in 2005. Though Shiite representation is not in any serious doubt, leftist voices not adverse to the resistance (The Communist Party and Najah Wakim’s Harakat al-Sha`b in Beirut) have managed to capture the Shiite vote in the past, sometimes even defying Hizballah alliances. Whether they will manage to do so this time — with electoral law reform as their agenda — would also be indicative of some dissatisfaction with Hizballah’s internal politics.

Like everyone else, I have seen this year’s elaborate electoral programs being waved in opponents’ faces on TV and I have heard candidates calling them “civilized,” but I have not seen them widen the debate. There has been another less advertised move towards issue- rather than identity-politics this year: Lebanese Parliamentary Monitor (LPM). In its “A`mal al-nuwwab” section (from the main menu to the right) you can research MP’s to find out what they have been up to in parliament since 2005. The idea is that as a citizen, I can use this resource to hold politicians accountable for their performance. A wonderful idea, no doubt.

But there is another insidious aspect to this project that turns it into little more than an exercise in futility. The NGO behind the project, “Towards Citizenship” (Nahwa al-muwatiniyah), starts with a mistaken premise: that it is lack of political education and awareness that generates the system we have in Lebanon today. Taking “enlightenment” as a starting point, the NGO has several projects pursuing education, dialogue, and advocacy as means towards convincing Lebanese (with a focus on youth) that citizenship — rather than religion, clan, etc — should be the primary principle of identity in Lebanon.

The envisioned end product — a parliamentary democracy with all its trappings — has yielded positive results in some countries. But to pinpoint ignorance as the root cause of this product’s failure in Lebanon is misguided at best. People I know who make their political decisions based on sect are fully “aware” of what a parliamentary democracy is. Their sectarian politics is a choice and an ordering of priorities, not the result of some false consciousness. Moreover, pursuing the path of “enlightening the masses” dismisses the resilience of sectarian identity as the primary principle of modern identity in Lebanon. Temporally and institutionally, its roots in Lebanon go at least as far back as “citizenship.”

We have seen how political programs were easily transformed in the hands of sectarian politics into a charade of sorts. Any ambitions of moving beyond the stagnant instability of current politics and of taking alternatives beyond a fringe group of dissatisfied members of the middle classes needs to begin by taking sectarian identity seriously rather than relegating it to ignorance or historical residues. Otherwise, we might very well end up with the trappings without the democracy. In the mean time, the LPM is an invaluable source and it remains to be seen whether the statistics will be shaken up over the next four years. I, for one, do not have to make any difficult decisions this Sunday: the results in my electoral district are a foregone conclusion.

* Borrowing “العصفورية المذهبية” from journalist Ali Hamadah and Omar Karami. I am not sure who coined it, but it has a nice ring to it and it evokes the “gilded cage”.

Today, al-Akhbar released a transcript (with some omissions) of the closed meeting between Walid Junblat and the Druze sheikhs which had been previously leaked on youtube in April. The original leak offered a rare glimpse of the everyday politics of sectarianism in Lebanon. And while the leak might have been more sensational, today’s transcript contextualizes better Junblat’s aim in the meeting: convincing those present to work the Druze rank and file into accepting coexsitence with the Shi`a (read Hizballah).

Steps towards reconciliation between Junblat and Hizballah have been in the making since the Doha meeting this past summer. Junblat immediately issued several overtures which culminated in Na`im Qasim revealing Hizballah’s decision to open up to Walid Junblat and suggesting that a meeting between Junblat and Nasrallah is possible after — and probably also in light of — the elections. Junblat’s attempt at smoothing the Druze wrinkles of last May might very well be a preparation for such an eventuality.

What I find most interesting, however, is the argumentation method Junblat used to convince those present of helping him with his goal: reconciliation or bloodshed. Pursuant to his summary of “we have the sea, we have Israel, and we have Syria,” he said:

ولما كانت الحرب، كنت أطلب الذخيرة، كان حافظ الأسد يلبّي طلبي سريعاً (الواحد بدو يذكر المساوئ والمحاسن) كانت قوافل الذخيرة تأتي من جديدة يابوس حتى حمّانا… صحيح خضنا الحرب، لكن اليوم ماذا أفعل؟ من أين أحصل على الذخيرة؟ من البحر؟ أو من إسرائيل؟ لا، من إسرائيل لا…

When there was [civil] war, I used to ask for munitions and Hafiz al-Asad would swiftly fulfill my request (one has to remember both the good and the bad characteristics). Caravans of munitions used to come from Jdaydit Yabus to Hammana. It is true we went to war, but what do I do today? Where do I get munitions from? From the sea? Or from Israel? No, not form Israel…

A structurally similar line of “alliance with Hizballah or bust” was forwarded during the “debate” between Ibrahim Kanaan and Sami Gemayel on Kalam al-Nas last Sunday (if you can stand 2+ hours of shouting, you can watch it here). Responding to Gemayel’s (read, Kataeb’s) one trick pony of “the state über alles” and to the accusation that the Free Patriotic Movement is providing cover for Hizballah’s project for Islamicizing Lebanon, Kanaan responded that the alternative to coming to an understanding with Hizballah would be “committing suicide” (towards the end the episode).

Earlier in the Kalam al-Nas debate (a cross between a cockfight and a bad domestic argument), Kanaan accused Gemayel’s party of waging “a campaign of fear” when it comes to Hizballah (عم بتخوفوا الناس). That much is obvious. From billboards, to slogans, to speeches… capitalizing on the events of May 7th has pretty much been March 14th ticket this electoral campaign. But one has to ask oneself, are not alliances and rapprochements with Hizballah, when framed as Junblat and Kanaan frame them, also campaigns of fear? Hizballah, it seems to me, can be a very useful and flexible tool.

Elections' Latest: Transparent Ballot Boxes (Source: www.annahar.com)

Following his article on electoral campaign advertisements, Ghassan Su`ud has another report this time on campaigning on the Internet. It is in Arabic, but it provides links to websites most of which have an English version (even francophone candidates are converting to English. What is the world coming to?).

Interestingly, Hizballah was among the first political parties to ride the Internet wave back in 1997, by first providing material to al-Mashriq and then, later, going off on their own. Things are different today. While March 14, the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, and the Kataeb have expended a lot of energy — and done so early on — to present their candidates and an “elections” section on their websites, Hizballah is playing it low key and has candidate blurbs only in Arabic. Future Movement followed suit more recently by adding a candidate section to its personality-cult website. And, apart from the advertisement at the bottom, I did not find any evidence on Amal’s website of an upcoming election.

This could be partly explained by the parties’ conceptions of the percentage of their electorate residing abroad and their dependence on the Internet. There is also the newly found savviness for corporate identity and image-management since the Cedar Revolution and its concomitant breed of graphic design tools. Most importantly, I do not think it is a coincidence that most of the electoral websites mentioned in Su`ud’s article belong to Christian candidates — specifically candidates running in Matn and Beirut 1 (Ashrafiyah, Rmayl, Sayfi). The parties with the most engaging websites are also invested in the results of the elections in these districts. Incidentally, Matn and Beirut 1, along with Zahlah, are the only real battlegrounds in the upcoming elections.

In case you have missed it, Min Beirut… bil 3arabe has an elections special: short clips from various Rahbani plays.

Though the Rahbani’s are mostly remembered as blue-eyed (or, alternatively, cynical), dream weavers of a non-existent (Christian) Lebanon, there is a sharper side to them. Some of this sharpness comes out in these Min Beirut clips. The second clip from Lulu, with its liturgical twist towards the end, is particularly delightful.

Last week, the Free Patriotic Movement unveiled its electoral program: Towards the Third Republic… (pdf). Aoun has discussed this concept at least as far back as 2001. But the Free Patriotic Movement has brilliantly capitalized on it for this electoral campaign. A while back, Ibrahim Kanaan elaborated in an interview with al-Akhbar on the three republics:

1st: the weak, post-independence republic. Characterized by the political classes’ divisions and thus inability “to protect Lebanon from regional forces.”

2nd: the corrupt, post-Taef republic. The Taef, again according to Kanaan, solved the first republic problem by inserting the need for an external valve, Syria. More importantly, this republic was corrupt and the cause behind the national debt.

3rd: the projected, FPM third republic. Characterized by a strong state, in contrast to the 1st, and a transparent and accountable system of governance, in contrast to the 2nd. Their impressive electoral program elaborates on how the party aims to achieve this vision.

There is much, much to say about the concept of the third republic – both its obvious ingeniousness and its less obvious assumptions – but I wanted to share a few things that struck me regarding its overall periodization.

First, any periodization is, of course, neither self-obvious nor given and, more often than not, serves a specific version of history. In this instance, FPM’s periodization builds on an existing one. It orchestrates history as a series of movements culminating in an interpretation of the present as a moment of crisis resulting from weakness and corruption. Even more so, with its emphasis on a stable, almost final epoch — “the third republic is stable” (see image) — this version of history borders on the messianic. The element of messianism is further buttressed by a major backbone of the electoral campaign deriving from the new testament verse ”Fal yakun kalamukum na`am, na`am, la, la” (“But let your words be yes, yes, and no, no; for anything which adds to these is deception.” Matthew 5:34-37). As if to further stress this point, in the al-Akhbar interview Kannan uses the expression “rusul al-jumhuriyah al-thalithah” (apostles of the third republic) to describe the party.

Second, this periodization is also informed by a derivative version of history, one that references the history of France, particularly the longest and first stable republic after a century of upheavals, la Troisième République. A Rajeh al-Khouri Op-Ed in al-Nahar asks: why is the third republic stable? The answer is simple: because la Troisième République was stable. But this is not merely a matter of translation. Together with the “Sois belle et vote” campaign advertisement and the new testament references, this leaves little doubt as to what audience will not only understand, but, more importantly, react to this as an “appellation,” to borrow from Althusser — i.e. recognizing themselves in an external projection that is in fact a barely disguised reflection of their inner conditioning. The function this performs — whether purposefully or not, whether successfully or not — is the reproduction of ideology.

There is one last point to the periodization in question, and that is the less obvious de facto acceptance of a specific version of Lebanon’s first republic. The problem with this Lebanon, according to FPM’s vision, is not its corruption, not its social and economic inequalities, not its marginalization of a large segment of its population. Although the electoral program diagnoses some problems that can be traced back to the first republic (rural neglect, for example), discursively, problems of corruption, bad management, and neglect are primarily stressed in relation to the post-Taef (read, Hariri) period. The main problem with the “golden period” of Lebanon’s pre-civil war history is, according to the third republic vision, primarily the weakness of the state. As such, whereas the FPM vision of history upon which “the third republic” builds diverges only in the more recent past from the “Maronite” history shared by its adversaries, it clashes dramatically with that of its allies.

Today’s al-Akhbar had an interesting article about the results of a survey conducted by Kamal Feghali (reproduced in table form above). Respondents in the 18 electoral districts were asked to grade politicians’ political performances on a scale of 0 to 10. Sulayman received the highest marks, followed by Baroud (only Baroud’s highest and lowest scores are given in the article). The remarkable thing is that despite “bir-rouh bid-damm” most other political leaders, both zu`ama and neo-zu`ama, do not fare as well. Another interesting result, pointed out in the article, is that Nasrallah is ahead of Hariri in majority Christian districts and even ahead of Aoun among the Christians of Akkar, Zahleh, and Baalbak. In addition, Jubran Basil reaps better results than Aoun in 13 of the 18 districts.

This all leads the article to conclude that the Lebanese value the performance of the “active minister” and thus show a bias in favor of the state and neutrality.  That is quite a jump! The scores respondents gave performances may have political relevance if one were to assume that political performance actually impacts political choices. And in Lebanon, I do not see what one has to do with the other. Still, respondents of all sects were able to point out a common set of achievers and grade them accordingly. That such a value system might exist, as the survey suggests, alongside the other set of considerations that ultimately shape political choices is in and of itself intriguing.

First off, I apologize for the hiatus on this blog. Teaching responsibilities and other personal reasons have placed it on the back-burner for a while. Thanks for continuing to stop by. This hiatus has a particularly unfortunate timing given the fact that we, the Lebanese, are about to dramatically change the course of our history on June 7. It is true. I saw it on the advertising campaigns of the various parties!

Perhaps the most fascinating thing about the elections this time round are the election campaign ads. A new era has been inaugurated by the Cedar Revolution. The musty, dime-a-dozen posters have lost their luster in the age of graphic and web designers. And as various fellow bloggers agree, Aoun’s FPM has had the most brilliant output. You can read more about these adventurous times on +961 and Remarkz, especially Bech’s post on campaigning. Beirut/NTSC has extensive coverage that attempts to crack the code of campaign ads. For analysis of a different sort and interesting debates in the comments section, check out the indispensable and indefatigable Qifa Nabki, if you have not already.

More soon… inshallah.

After four marathonic sessions in parliament, the Electoral Law has been approved… without introducing much new. This, despite in-depth studies and recommendations by the Electoral Committee (for more, see previous posts from May).

Here is a sample of approved reforms (details here, in Arabic): reinforcing a culture of election and reinforcing democracy (whatever that means); submitting a report after the elections including suggestions for improvement (again!?); holding elections in one day (one positive thing) or maybe two should security dictate it (oh…); overseeing campaign spending; forbidding campaigning and distribution of electoral lists in front of polling stations on election day; etc.

There is more but there is a unifying theme for all of these “reforms”: make-up. Even the articles that could potentially be other than makeup (eg. limiting campaign spending, forbidding distribution of lists) have been approved only because they can be easily circumvented. Seriously, who is going to hold violators accountable?

On the other hand, simple reforms that would have made a world of difference were not introduced. Here is an emblematic one: On election day, pre-prepared and custom-tailored lists are habitually handed out at polling stations. Those handed a list upon entry are expected to drop it in the ballot box… as is. Combined with a stick-and-carrot approach, these lists effectively annul the right to a secret ballot. The Minister of Interior, Ziad Baroud, proposed today to introduce a printed-out, official and unified list of candidates for each electoral district that voters can tick off behind a curtain. A basic and, according to Baroud, doable solution. The proposal was defeated when put to vote: 50-70. No justification was offered. In addition, the voting pattern did not fall along loyalists-opposition lines (as if this division means anything!). Amal, Hizballah, Lebanese Forces, and Future Movement all voted against it (to their credit, FPM voted for the proposal).

Over the past four long years, resistance and dignity (Hizballah & Co.) and liberty and sovereignty (Hariri & Co.) took the front seat. This week the very same people who use this wooden language voted down reforms that could potentially turn these empty concepts into reality. Between the two possibilities of war without end and greed without limits, yet another election will be held under a semi-fabricated perpetual state of emergency.

To those unwilling or unable to follow news in Arabic, the Lebanese daily, al-Akhbar, dropped a journalistic bombshell Thursday. Three journalists from the newspaper had an off the record chat with Walid Junblat. Only al-Akhbar published what Junblat said (the LA Times picked up on this).

Off the record, Junblat said many things. He said he realized what it meant when Rice said that it is the Syrian regime’s behavior they want to change, not the regime itself. But that nevertheless he kept up the provocation because “politics demands it.”

He also said that they have to live with Hizballah’s weapons until regional or international changes allow for Hizballah’s gradual integration into the state and that Ahmadinajad will not give up those weapons until Iran feels secure in its position.

al-Mustaqbal party received the brunt of Junblat’s criticism. He said Hariri Jr. has evolved over the past three years, but those around him have not. He also criticized Hariri Jr. for playing a dangerous game with the Salafis saying it was well that he ended it in good time. Of al-Mustaqbal parliamentarians, he said they are Sunni fanatics even when there are no elections, especially Fatfat and his likes. He also criticized Hariri’s advisors, especially Maher Hammoud and `Uqab Saqr (the latter also behind savior of the Shia, emancipator of the muhajjabat: Meouw Lebanon).

Of the Christian allies, he said they have become a burden. He spoke about the conflicts between the March 14 Christians and the narrow party fanaticism that prevented Nayla Mouawwad and Butrus Harb from becoming ministers, knowing that they would have improved election results. Today, on the record, he jumped ahead of the criticism in what sounds like a prelude to electoral alliances with March 8 in Ba`abda.

And much, much more. al-Akhbar have broken professional protocol and they know it. They said enough to elicit a swift reaction from Junblat and an affirmation of the “deep and historical ties” that bind him with al-Mustaqbal, saying that al-Akhbar has taken things out of context and distorted meanings. al-Akhbar yesterday clarified that it had printed exactly what Junblat said, explaining:

al-Akhbar has enough literary courage to apologize to its readers for being quick in affording them a view into the backstage of political life, even if it came at the expense of professional protocol.

Sensationalist? Maybe. Unprofessional? With sleazy, conniving, narrow-minded, blood-sucking, self-centered, short-sighted, back-stabbing, royalty-on-a-garbage-dump politicians like these, you cannot go wrong. There are many things al-Akhbar can be criticized for – among them their thin criticism of Hizballah and a lack of sharp political analysis, the likes of which Joseph Samahah was able to produce. But with its blend of excellent reporting and unconventional ethics, it is breaking new ground in the pitiful, stale journalistic life of Lebanon. One can only hope that, as election time miracles keep multiplying, there will be more such unethical revelations about the petty considerations that drive Lebanese politics.

So, what the hell just happened in the North? First, an overblown, negative reaction to a memorandum of understanding between Hizballah and (some) Salafis. Then, the Saudi ambassador makes a surprise visit to Tripoli, eliciting in his wake a delirious torrent about Tripoli being the be-all end-all of all Sunnis. And now, the reconciliation in Tripoli strikes, like a bolt of lightning from a clear sky.

Both the delirium and the reconciliation have been interpreted in the Lebanese press (some of it, as the case always is) as repercussions of the Saudi visit to Tripoli (and international pressure on Saudi). Muhammad al-Safadi, a billionaire politician with excellent connections in Saudi Arabia and some following in the north (he also happens to be Minister of Economy & Trade), made some statements last week confirming suspicions that Hariri Jr. is changing his policy and opening up to other Sunni parties.

Saudis, the story goes, have given up on the untalented Sa`d and are investing in a wider Sunni base under the banner of “unifying the Sunnis”. This, however, does not explain the portrayal of the Tripoli reconciliation as a Sa`d Hariri accomplishment, this despite the presence of Sanioura, Karami, and Safadi. Not to mention that Miqati decided not to join, sending a representative in his stead, and al-Ahdab, the harbinger of doom, did not show up in any incarnation. Disgruntlement, to say the least.

In light of this, there is another reading to these developments. The memorandum signed in the Mufti’s residence could be more of a move to shore up rather than undermine Hariri Jr. It is no secret that Hariri’s popularity took a dunk after last May and this has had its severest impact in the North. Although he does not face much competition in Beirut, with the presence of smaller players such as Karami, Miqati, and Safadi and with recent talk about a Safadi-Karami coalition for the next elections, Hariri might very well perform poorly in the North. This Sunni-Sunni reconciliation (no, not Alawi-Sunni, I am afraid), will work in Hariri’s favor.

Whichever the case may be, Saudi Arabia has used the influence it has on its Sunni friends and allies, to “facilitate” coalitions and perhaps even broaden Hariri’s electoral base. Election year in Lebanon is full of surprises and miracles. The blind see, the paralyzed move, and the dead are brought back to life. Considering that a Sunni-Sunni alliance of “moderates” will leave many in Tripoli disgruntled, it remains to be seen whether this miracle will have any impact on Jabal Muhsin and Tabbaneh.

The Doha meetings were less of a “shock treatment,” as they have been called, and more of a placebo – no doubt brought about by regional occurrences whose contours are yet to emerge. If I have been harping on obsessively about the electoral law, it is because if the other aspects of the agreement have momentarily brought us back from the brink, it is the electoral law that will serve to reproduce the political class that will take us back to the brink.

Notwithstanding, al-Akhbar alone has picked up on this issue. One article cites an unnamed Beiruti parliamentarian who believes that the electoral law is the only real event in Doha, since the unity government will only be able to fulfill a caretaker role in preparation for the parliamentary elections next summer.

In addition to the farce of pre-allocating seats to be “elected” (see my previous post), the parliamentarian adds that the law presupposes the sectarian division of the districts. Therefore, its success, as far as the political elite is concerned, depends on keeping the high degree of sectarianism ongoing for the next year. The media, as usual, is playing and will continue to play its dutiful role.

According to another al-Akhbar article, the two main accomplishments of the new electoral law are (1) Future Movement does not feel defeated in Beirut and (2) the Christian voice has been reinstated. Abdo Sa`d, director of the Beirut Center for Research and Information, criticizes the law for not following proportional representation. This, again according to Sa`d, blocks the emergence of a new Sunni political elite, leaving hegemony to the Future Movement. Given Abdo Sa`d’s political inclinations, it should come as no surprise that he fails to mention that the relative majority system (a.k.a. first-past-the-post) blocks the emergence of any alternative, Sunni or otherwise.

All this is truly heartbreaking. It is all the more heartbreaking because all the work has been done. A guide to the proposed draft law can be read here (pdf). The suggested reforms are summarized here by Paul Salem. (both in English)

If I were into conspiracy theories, I would say the political elite engineered the whole crisis to reproduce themselves the way they did in Doha. But this is not a conspiracy. It is a farce. If it is making many Lebanese happy, it is because the only alternative they are being offered by their leadership is even worse.