a word or two about the new government

As most followers of all things Lebanese know, a unity government headed by Saad Hariri has been formed after five months of… well, formation. Ziad Baroud is going to retain his position as Minister of Interior (president’s share) and that is good news. But there is even better news: The Free Patriotic Movement has chosen no other than economist, activist, and intellectual Sharbil Nahhas for the post of Minister of Telecommunications. To those of you not familiar with Sharbil Nahhas, his website (trilingual) gives a good idea of his qualifications. Nahhas is a reformer in spirit with a fundamental critique and understanding of our sectarian system. Over the past two decades, Nahhas has put together several proposals, such as a strategy for social development and a law proposal for a pension scheme, that, needless to say, never made it through the system. As the inside man, there is reason to hope a little.

Other than Baroud and Nahhas, there are actually some good choices in this makeup (by “good” I mean people who are actually into “governing” while in government). Rayya Haffar al-Hassan (Future Movement) came in as first Lebanese female minister of Finance ever and one of two women in the unity government. No fundamental change is going to come from these quarters. She has been schooled by Hariri and Sanioura and, as she herself has declared, she intends to follow similar financial policies. But to be realistic, she is competent and one can hope this will reflect on the ever ballooning public debt. Fadi Abboud (FPM, tourism) and Hassan Mnaymnah (Future Movement, education) are also promising choices. As for Amal, Hizballah, and Junblat, they have mostly exhibited characteristic lack of creativity in their choice of ministers.

There has also been a lot of focus in the media on Hariri’s snub to the Kataeb. The Gemayyel party has been dealt what is regarded in Lebanon as a third rate ministry, namely Social Affairs. There are two things to note here. The first is that far from being a shock, this comes as the culmination of the problems Kataeb has been having with March 14, not just Hariri. The second point is summarized succinctly by Khaled Saghiyah in today’s al-Akhbar: “The government to Hariri is like the weapons to Hizballah; you can support it as an ally but you cannot partake of it.”

Next on the agenda, a Hariri pilgrimage to Damascus to be followed by a Junblat chaser.

 

the great cultural divide

For some reason, some native intellectuals insist on adopting the reductionist model of backwardness vs. progress to explain politics in Lebanon today. The latest incarnation is an op-ed by Hazim Saghiyah (not to be confused with the nephew, Khalid) published in Meow Lebanon. Referring to an electoral speech delivered by Jubran Basil, Saghiyah explains:

This distinction between “the materialism of the West” and “the spiritualism of the East” is not new, nor is it monopolized by the Lebanese. What is new is that it is now emanating from a political party [the Free Patriotic Movement] that continuously expresses its attachment to modernity and to “reform and change.” But Hizballah has already, in its last electoral program, announced “fighting vice” as one of its points [...]

[...] There are therefore, regardless of the election and its results and away from politics in its daily and common conception, signs of a cultural alliance, one might say, between the two parties of Mar Mkhayel [signatories of the memorandum of understanding]. And the direct enemy of this alliance is: freedom and progress.

For an intellectual, Saghiyah is incredibly ignorant of Middle Eastern intellectual history. The distinction between the materiality of the West and the spirituality and values of the East is not meeting its modernist and reformist counterpart for the first time. It is precisely the product of a modern condition and a modern reorganization of knowledge that attempted to shore up and define a disempowered “East” against a politically, economically, and militarily powerful “West.” A counter-Orientalism, if you will, belonging to the time of al-nahdah (late 19th century Arab “renaissance”).

But what is more interesting is the political expediency to Saghiyhah’s intellectual musings. By branding the Free Patriotic Movement and Hizballah as the darkest relics of the past, their opponents emerge as champions of “freedom and progress.” On what he means by that, he explains: “[...] the most important foundations and characteristics of Lebanon, as in opening up to the Arab and western worlds, as well as in its economy and prosperity.” When defined in this truncated manner, one is tempted to follow up with the conclusion that Gulf states are beacons of freedom and progress!

This watered down definition eschews — perhaps unwittingly — more common and fundamental aspects of “freedom and progress” such as democratic practices and representation, freedom of the press and the media, a redistribution of economic opportunities, a structure of rights and duties, etc… etc… Naturally so, because if Saghiyah were to highlight these instead, one would be hard pressed to find a place for March 14 in their midst. But the only way to grant March 14 the cultural legitimacy and civilizational mission that it claims for itself — without questioning it or questioning the regional power structure behind it — is to cast its opponents as partners in an anti-modern, cultural alliance.

Though these cultural claims to civilization are not new in Lebanon, they have persisted over the past few years in a very bare and highly politicized form. Today, however, there were hints in the Lebanese media of a possible reshuffling of alliances that is to take place in the coming weeks. If this reshuffling were indeed to happen, it would be interesting to watch where leftists-turned-liberals such as Hazim Saghiyah will turn to next.

 

the merciless wheels of democracy

In case you are still wondering why exactly Minister of Interior, Ziad Baroud’s proposal for pre-printed ballots was vehemently opposed by Amal, Hizballah, the Lebanese Forces, and the Future Movement:

What happens is that the campaign machines themselves print a list of candidates that they want you to put in the ballot box, and distribute it. That sounds harmless, but it’s the key device to track votes. Most people vote in villages, where you have rarely more than 2,000 voters, who are further subdivided by sect and by family register numbers. So if in a given voting room you have ten major families, they will distribute ten different versions of the same list to those families — different in font, name order, etc. During vote count, the election monitors of the various candidates inspect any single ballot paper, and they track exactly how many copies of what version ended up in the box. And after the elections, they may come to the head of that family and tell him: hey — we promised you to pay the tuition for your nephew, we settled your cousin’s hospital bill — why didn’t you guys vote for us?

There is another ingenious device to insure people vote the way they are supposed to or paid to: the “rent-an-ID” method. Basically, you are paid a certain sum of money in return for giving up your national identity card until election day. Then, on the appointed day, you are met by a representative who hands you your ID and a ballot, making sure you drop the latter “as is” (mitil/zayy ma hiyyi).

 

Elliot Abrams’ democracy

Just when you thought you had seen the last of him, here he goes again. With elections in Lebanon and Iran within a week of each other, why not reflect on democracy:

There are rumors about large amounts of Saudi money floating in to support the victorious March 14 coalition, but so what? Hezbollah gets at least $200 million a year from Iran. It is striking that the losers are not crying foul; they too agree the election was fundamentally fair.

As long as everyone agrees that foreign interference and ridiculous amounts of money being thrown around are the order of the day, it must be free and fair elections. Just another day in the life of Elliot Abrams. Read all about it.

 

a time for citrous introspection

With Amal and Hizballah reaffirming their presence in their districts and Sulayman Franjiyah reconsolidating his fiefdom in Zgharta, the biggest losers in these elections have been the Free Patriotic Movement. Though they still represent a considerable chunk of the Christians, the shock of the decline since 2005 against all expectations and predictions is still reverberating.

Critiques of “what went wrong” abound, and Khalid Saghiyah rises to the occassion again with a sharp one. He criticizes ongoing attempts to justify the electoral loss, including the appeal to the popular vote, stressing instead the need for introspection on several levels: the sectarian discourse, the divisive electoral law, and the “glorious day” (May 7th, 2008).

But he also nails down other blunders:

• Hizballah’s resignation when it comes to its Sunni allies, who have been left to their own devices. Hizballah “bet instead on the Christian horse” leaving the Sunnis feeling besieged.
• The inability to transform the memorandum of understanding from an “alliance” into an “understanding” over common political and national grounds, leaving a glaring gap between “the public” of Hizballah and that of the Free Patriotic Movement.
• The “anthem against corruption” remained sensational and vague. He points out that while Aoun’s discourse on corruption might “tickle the feelings” of the middle class, it is out of tune with the popular classes that are dependent on the channels of corruption and clientalism. I think this observation can also be used to critique the approach of idealist, typically middle class alternatives for governance — such as secularization, centralization, etc — which ignore the realities on the ground, be those engendered by choice or lack of it.
• The opposition’s inability to concretize its slogan of “building the strong, capable, and just state.” In fact, when it came to ministerial appointments, the selection of electoral candidates, and the paucity of their political programs, the opposition repeated the mistakes of the governmental majority.

 

dissecting the vote

It is one thing to try and understand vote composition along the lines of various groups, be they defined by gender, social class, age etc. And in Lebanon of course, sect becomes the overriding category. But to take this to the level of judging whether someone was voted in with the “right” votes or not is a dangerous game of numbers. That the balance was tipped by the Shiite vote in favor of the Free Patriotic Movement in Byblos (which, it turns out, is not even accurate given the margin of ca. 8,000 votes) and Baabda or by the Sunni vote in favor of March 14 in Zahleh, does that make it less legitimate? Even in a thoroughly sectarian system such as ours, a citizen of a non-majority sect in a certain district is still represented — on a practical level, at least — by the parliamentarians from that district. Instead, s/he is being treated like a resident alien with voting rights. I am surprised no one has suggested population transfers yet.

But it does not stop here. Hints of the “outside” vote of the Armenians were not absent from this electoral battle either. Harping on the Greek Orthodox tendon of Ashrafiyah was also an electoral strategy — and a successful one by the looks of it. Where does it stop? Is a Greek Orthodox vote cast in Matn the “right” one? Is a Maronite vote cast in Ashrafiyah the “right” one? If my mother is Greek Orthodox Lebanese and my father a Shiite Iraqi and I have been naturalized in 1995 as Shiite, but have been living in France since 1996 with my Maronite husband and came back to vote for Aoun in Byblos, would that make mine a “right” vote? I wonder.

 

shooting blanks and the popular vote

An "invalid" ballot: "Shit on you and on these elections. 'Banana republic.' Signed: A decent citizen." (Source: www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/140198)

Since I have nothing to do but write a dissertation, I spent last night trying to make some sense of the numerical aspects of the elections. This year, thanks to Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud, blank votes were counted separately and not together with invalid votes. This went down well with eleven thousand one hundred and ninety-seven voters, or 0.82% of cast ballots (Sean has a table with the breakdown of blank votes per district). It might not seem much, but one has to keep in mind the voting conditions at various polling stations and that this is the first time a distinction between “blank” and “invalid” votes is implemented. Given that in Lebanese elections no one is ever sure how many of the eligible voters are actually alive or around, abstaining from the vote in protest might be misinterpreted as, well, death. That is why I think the blank vote is important — it not only protests the lack of choices, but it also asserts a presence, both physical and political.

My other perfect excuse for procrastination was “the popular vote.” Hassan Nasrallah brought it up in his speech last night when commenting on the election results and Al of Ex Oriente Lux picks up on this issue. Nasrallah said the opposition probably has the popular vote and that he will leave it to the professionals to figure it out. According to a study cited by al-Akhbar (bottom of the page), the opposition received 54.5% of the popular vote, whereas the ruling coalition received 45.5%. I find it funny that the total adds up to 100%. As far as I know, we have not succumbed to the two-party system yet and there was a visible amount of votes cast for people not running on either lists, especially in Hizballah and Amal’s backyards.

Now I am no professional, but here are the numbers I got when, instead of taking the voters as blocks of with or against, I added the total number of votes cast for the total number of candidates in three categories: opposition 50.4%, ruling coalition 46%, and other 3.6%. I only did the numbers once and I might have missed an affiliated independent or two, but not any with a considerable number of votes attached.

These numbers are, of course, distorted on many levels, one of the main distortions being the opposition within Sunni and Shia turfs. This is particularly significant in majority Shia areas where the ruling coalition presence is weak, the “existential” confrontation is low priority, and the challenge comes from friendly quarters. Such was the case in Baalbak-Hermel and Hasbayya-Marji`yun where opposition competitors received some 10% of the vote.

As Ibrahim al-Amin points out in the al-Akhbar article linked to above, had there been a system of proportional representation, a bloc representing a substantial number of the Shia would most likely emerge. Which is why, all calls to the contrary notwithstanding, Hizballah has no interest in improving Shia representation — and I have posted on this before. That is why I find that Hassan Nasrallah’s passing comment on the popular vote has little to do with rights or justice. I see it instead as a performative utterance that indulges the feelings of underrepresentation that the Shia (rightfully) have and tickles the demographic fear the rest suffer from. All the while papering over the more complex realities that assure the indefinite continuation of the status quo.

 

erase and rewind

The relatively smooth elections were followed by an eventless celebration of a March 14 and allies win by a clear margin. Some shooting incidents have been reported today, but nothing out of the “ordinary” so far. Anyone attempting to explain the results of this election in simplistic terms or to attribute it to declarations by Joe Biden or Jeffrey Feltman will have a hard time reconciling the larger picture with the nitty gritty of political life in Lebanon. As is always the case with Lebanese politics, the devil is in the details.

Back in 2005, March 14 and allies won 72 of the 128 seats, Hizballah/Amal and allies won 35, and the Free Patriotic Movement won 14. In terms of overall numbers, there is not much change this year. There are some minor changes in the composition. For example, Aoun got a free ride in Jizzin this time where he swept all three seats at Nabih Berri’s expense. Such shifts notwithstanding, talk of the incredible retreat in Aoun’s popularity since 2005 are exaggerated. With his allies, he still retains the largest Christian bloc in parliament despite the fact that the seats were won by narrower margins than in 2005. But this has to be seen in light of the immense wave of popularity Aoun rode upon his return from France and which four years of Lebanese politics are enough to squander… for anyone.

The real blow for the opposition, particularly the Free Patriotic Movement, was that they expected to garner more seats under the new, more representative law. Since Hizballah and Amal’s wins in largely homogenous districts were guaranteed, the burden was on Aoun to carry out the victory in majority Christian areas. What happened, in a sense, was that instead of favoring the FPM, the new electoral law magnified the political divisions within Christian communities and reproduced them on an ever smaller scale. The dramatic differences in voting patterns from one Christian village to another is evidence of this.

Aoun did deliver in Baabda (6-0), Kisirwan (5-0), Matn (6-2), and Byblos (3-0) — this despite Michel al-Murr migrating to March 14th in Matn and president Michel Sulayman’s last minute withdrawal of his candidate in Byblos to the benefit of March 14th. But the seats gained in these districts were lost in Zahleh (0-7), Batroun (0-2), and Beirut 1 (0-5). The tenacious “Muslim” vote was not absent from these battles, though, with the Shiite vote in Baabda and Byblos and the Sunni in Zahleh and Kurah influencing the final results. Anger at Hizballah in Batroun probably also played a hand in the ignominious defeat of incumbent minister of telecommunications and Aoun’s son-in-law, Jubran Basil (the soldier who died when Hizballah shot down the Lebanese army helicopter last summer was from Batroun).

So, we are back to the status quo that existed after the alliance between Hizballah and March 14th broke down in 2005. This happens to the relief of many, perhaps even Hizballah who were quick to concede defeat last night. But the pre-Doha status quo carries with it the dangers that have engulfed Lebanon the past four years. Where the different parties will go with the results of the elections depends on the government formation process and — to zoom back out again — on regional developments. Surprises and reshuffles of the kind that followed the 2005 elections are not to be ruled out completely. Not yet.

Addendum 1 (14:55 Beirut time): Talk about striking while the iron is hot. Muhammad Raad (Hizballah MP) assured AFP that the crisis will continue unless the majority “changes its behavior.” He listed basic principles the majority should abide by, first among them is leaving Hizballah’s weapons alone, another is to grant either guarantees or a blocking third in government.

Addendum 2 (15:14 Beirut time): Official results of Lebanese elections 2009 on the Ministry of Interior website (in Arabic).

 

election hotspots: beyond opposition and loyalists

The defining feature of these elections, both in Lebanon and abroad, has been the battle between the opposition and the government coalition. While seats in areas such as Beirut 3, Tripoli, South, and Beqa`-Hermel are mostly spoken for, real electoral battles are being waged in majority Christian areas between the Free Patriotic Movement and Christian parties under the March 14 umbrella. There are, however, other interesting flashpoints that go beyond the opposition/loyalists battle. Here are a few:

Beirut 3: The opposition list does not include either Hizballah or Amal, but rather a wide array of candidates from the leftist Harakat al-Sha`b to Sunni Beiruti families sidelined by Hariri (eg. `Itani). Although the seats are almost guaranteed to Sa`d al-Hariri, “almost” is the keyword. The opposition list’s ambition is to demonstrate that Beirut does not “belong” to Hariri and winning only one seat would make the point (Hariri battled down to the last seat in Beirut during the negotiations in Doha last summer). The Shiite vote alone is not enough for this, the opposition list would also need a high turn out (since the end of the civil war, the highest in what constitutes this district today is 24%).

`Akkar: There are several factors to keep in mind with respect to `Akkar. The feeling among the Sunnis of being let down after May 7th of last year and al-Mustaqbal’s neglect of the Wadi Khalid clans are first among them. Then there are also the Christians of `Akkar, whose vote, given the first sentiment, might end up having an impact. Though this does not really go beyond the broad guidelines of opposition vs. March 14, the results in this district would be very indicative of the position Sa`d Hariri now occupies among the Sunnis of the north. This is especially significant given the battle in Sidon, another Mustaqbal backyard, between Bahiya Hariri and Fuad Sanioura, on the one hand, and the Usama Sa`d and Abdel Rahman Bazzi coalition on the other.

West Biqa`-Rashayya: The Communist Party, running on the single-issue platform of proportional representation, is fielding five candidates this year and, barring surprises, none of them stand a chance. CP candidates Sam`an Laqqis (Kurah) and Faruq Dahrouj (West Biqa`) have insisted on running despite opposition pressure to withdraw. Dahrouj has particularly faced a lot of pressure, including some say Syrian, to move his candidacy to Zahle for the benefit of Abdul Rahim Murad. Getting one or two candidates on board is important for the opposition due to the symbolic value this district has for traditional allies of Syria. It would therefore be significant if Dahrouj manages to get enough votes to sabotage the opposition.

Marji`yun-Hasbayya: It would also be interesting to keep an eye on Sa`dallah Mazra`ani of the Communist Party to see how many votes the resistance-friendly left will be able to garner in Hizballah/Amal playground this time round. Though the Communist Party denies it, it seems there were attempts to reach some sort of deal with the opposition when the lists were being put together, but the party was shoved aside by Hizballah — which has been consistent in its aversion to leftist candidates in the past.

Granted, none of this constitutes much challenge to the main antagonists, yet the results can serve as an indication of the sway they have over their electorate. While no one can claim the Christian vote and no one can challenge the Shiite, it is mostly Sa`d al-Hariri’s credentials that are being put to the test after the carte blanche he was given in 2005. Though Shiite representation is not in any serious doubt, leftist voices not adverse to the resistance (The Communist Party and Najah Wakim’s Harakat al-Sha`b in Beirut) have managed to capture the Shiite vote in the past, sometimes even defying Hizballah alliances. Whether they will manage to do so this time — with electoral law reform as their agenda — would also be indicative of some dissatisfaction with Hizballah’s internal politics.

 

citizenry in “the sectarian madhouse”*

Like everyone else, I have seen this year’s elaborate electoral programs being waved in opponents’ faces on TV and I have heard candidates calling them “civilized,” but I have not seen them widen the debate. There has been another less advertised move towards issue- rather than identity-politics this year: Lebanese Parliamentary Monitor (LPM). In its “A`mal al-nuwwab” section (from the main menu to the right) you can research MP’s to find out what they have been up to in parliament since 2005. The idea is that as a citizen, I can use this resource to hold politicians accountable for their performance. A wonderful idea, no doubt.

But there is another insidious aspect to this project that turns it into little more than an exercise in futility. The NGO behind the project, “Towards Citizenship” (Nahwa al-muwatiniyah), starts with a mistaken premise: that it is lack of political education and awareness that generates the system we have in Lebanon today. Taking “enlightenment” as a starting point, the NGO has several projects pursuing education, dialogue, and advocacy as means towards convincing Lebanese (with a focus on youth) that citizenship — rather than religion, clan, etc — should be the primary principle of identity in Lebanon.

The envisioned end product — a parliamentary democracy with all its trappings — has yielded positive results in some countries. But to pinpoint ignorance as the root cause of this product’s failure in Lebanon is misguided at best. People I know who make their political decisions based on sect are fully “aware” of what a parliamentary democracy is. Their sectarian politics is a choice and an ordering of priorities, not the result of some false consciousness. Moreover, pursuing the path of “enlightening the masses” dismisses the resilience of sectarian identity as the primary principle of modern identity in Lebanon. Temporally and institutionally, its roots in Lebanon go at least as far back as “citizenship.”

We have seen how political programs were easily transformed in the hands of sectarian politics into a charade of sorts. Any ambitions of moving beyond the stagnant instability of current politics and of taking alternatives beyond a fringe group of dissatisfied members of the middle classes needs to begin by taking sectarian identity seriously rather than relegating it to ignorance or historical residues. Otherwise, we might very well end up with the trappings without the democracy. In the mean time, the LPM is an invaluable source and it remains to be seen whether the statistics will be shaken up over the next four years. I, for one, do not have to make any difficult decisions this Sunday: the results in my electoral district are a foregone conclusion.

* Borrowing “العصفورية المذهبية” from journalist Ali Hamadah and Omar Karami. I am not sure who coined it, but it has a nice ring to it and it evokes the “gilded cage”.