An "invalid" ballot: "Shit on you and on these elections. 'Banana republic.' Signed: A decent citizen." (Source: http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/140198)
Since I have nothing to do but write a dissertation, I spent last night trying to make some sense of the numerical aspects of the elections. This year, thanks to Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud, blank votes were counted separately and not together with invalid votes. This went down well with eleven thousand one hundred and ninety-seven voters, or 0.82% of cast ballots (Sean has a table with the breakdown of blank votes per district). It might not seem much, but one has to keep in mind the voting conditions at various polling stations and that this is the first time a distinction between “blank” and “invalid” votes is implemented. Given that in Lebanese elections no one is ever sure how many of the eligible voters are actually alive or around, abstaining from the vote in protest might be misinterpreted as, well, death. That is why I think the blank vote is important — it not only protests the lack of choices, but it also asserts a presence, both physical and political.
My other perfect excuse for procrastination was “the popular vote.” Hassan Nasrallah brought it up in his speech last night when commenting on the election results and Al of Ex Oriente Lux picks up on this issue. Nasrallah said the opposition probably has the popular vote and that he will leave it to the professionals to figure it out. According to a study cited by al-Akhbar (bottom of the page), the opposition received 54.5% of the popular vote, whereas the ruling coalition received 45.5%. I find it funny that the total adds up to 100%. As far as I know, we have not succumbed to the two-party system yet and there was a visible amount of votes cast for people not running on either lists, especially in Hizballah and Amal’s backyards.
Now I am no professional, but here are the numbers I got when, instead of taking the voters as blocks of with or against, I added the total number of votes cast for the total number of candidates in three categories: opposition 50.4%, ruling coalition 46%, and other 3.6%. I only did the numbers once and I might have missed an affiliated independent or two, but not any with a considerable number of votes attached.
These numbers are, of course, distorted on many levels, one of the main distortions being the opposition within Sunni and Shia turfs. This is particularly significant in majority Shia areas where the ruling coalition presence is weak, the “existential” confrontation is low priority, and the challenge comes from friendly quarters. Such was the case in Baalbak-Hermel and Hasbayya-Marji`yun where opposition competitors received some 10% of the vote.
As Ibrahim al-Amin points out in the al-Akhbar article linked to above, had there been a system of proportional representation, a bloc representing a substantial number of the Shia would most likely emerge. Which is why, all calls to the contrary notwithstanding, Hizballah has no interest in improving Shia representation — and I have posted on this before. That is why I find that Hassan Nasrallah’s passing comment on the popular vote has little to do with rights or justice. I see it instead as a performative utterance that indulges the feelings of underrepresentation that the Shia (rightfully) have and tickles the demographic fear the rest suffer from. All the while papering over the more complex realities that assure the indefinite continuation of the status quo.
June 9, 2009 at 1:53 pm
great minds obviously think alike! I only have about 200 papers to grade for Friday, but I was going to go through the votes and figure out the popular vote, but I see you’ve beat me to the punch (and done the work for me!). Did you make an excel sheet or chart? Do you want to make my day and send it to me?
Also, are you using the Ministry site’s numbers? I found a load of problems in the summaries at the beginning of each district. Also, it’s a super pain that they made a PDF for each individual district and no master file. If you haven’t already made it, I can send you a lump PDF with all the districts…
June 9, 2009 at 1:54 pm
[...] votes, yesterday, I saw this wonderful picture in the centerfold of al-Akhbar. Ms Tee, who has a wonderful post up on the popular vote, which I’ll address tonight or tomorrow, directed me to +961, who [...]
June 9, 2009 at 2:35 pm
Great minds procrastinate alike too, it seems! I will make your day soon and I would like to know what results you come up with.
I am using the Arabic version of the Ministry of Interior. Since it was up first, I am assuming the others were translated from it and so it would contain less errors. But errors abound there too.
June 10, 2009 at 6:58 am
Good post, Ms Tee. The popular vote comment has played on my mind also.
Re Hizballah, I find it difficult to understand their intentions.
Whilst, perhaps, their desire is to maintain the “state-within-a-state” status quo, and rule over autonomous Shia regions (as all sects do), they are allied with a faction that promotes power centralisation, investment in state institutions, and breaking the autonomy of the sects as their primary goals (FPM).
As many of us have stated, no heavyweight political party has a real desire to change the status quo. Most political parties thrive on political sectarianism, and enjoy their autonomous rule over their sects. All parties know that a centralisation of state power would only diminish their autonomy, and relative power in their regions.
However, the constant political wrangling and shuffling over the past 4 years has highlighted a trend towards a national political interaction that is forcing the sectarian blocs to think outside of the box.
The fact that we have two multi-sectarian political alliances demonstrates that all parties are – subconsciously – aware that their sectarian “autonomy” is dependent on its interactions with the state, and indeed, the other communities.
So the questions here are:
Is this multi-sectarian political interaction part of a natural and inevitable trend towards the nationalisation and centralisation of power?
Can Hizballah, and indeed the country, avoid investing in this process even though, as you highlighted, they probably don’t want to?
June 10, 2009 at 9:53 am
[...] different implications depending on whether you’re looking at the parliamentary results, the popular results or the sectarian results. If anyone gets some more concrete (and sourced!) information on thet [...]
June 10, 2009 at 11:08 am
Good to see you back, Antoun.
With the kind of popular support they enjoy, I don’t see why the large parties would want to change. The numbers are depressing. Some pressure from civil society has born fruit, as Paul Salem is cited to have said Chez Qifa Nabki. And we have seen how the diligence of just one minister, Ziad Baroud, can shake up the scene. But the pressure needs to be persistent, from within and without. FPM promises a different kind of politics, true. Which is why I was curious to see how they would function from a position of power.
As for multi-sectarian interaction, my sense of it is that it has been very non-interactive. There are no projects in common. Concrete, day to day praxis that generates a common sense of responsibility. It has been more tactical alliances which can shift with no real effect on the running of the country. The republic’s history is full of those. In my opinion, we have become too hooked up on “identity” to the detriment of a long and vibrant history of governance and management.
June 10, 2009 at 12:31 pm
Curious to see what you make of this: Friday Lunch Club comes up with very different numbers but doesn’t say how. And then Landis seems to pull a 15% margin out of I don’t know where.
June 10, 2009 at 1:49 pm
The list on FLC seems to be the same one cited by al-Akhbar. The key is the independents. From what I gather, FLC’s included under March 14 almost all that is not Hizballah. I calculated those who were not affiliated with M14 or M8 under “Other.” About the 15%, I have no clue where it came from either.
This numbers business is a bit funny considering all the layers of representational distortion involved. That is why I brought up the issue of proportional representation. The popular vote for both Mustaqbal and HA/Amal would be very different under those circumstances. It is no secret that our representational democracy is barely representational. Which angle you choose to critique it from (including mine) is as political a choice as any. There is nothing objective about it.
Thanks for alerting me to FLC’s list. I was wondering how they got the numbers in al-Akhbar.
June 10, 2009 at 3:10 pm
I suspected this. The list on FLC is based on a study by Abdo Saad’s Markaz Bayrut lil-Abhath wa-l-Ma`lumat.
August 13, 2009 at 1:19 am
[...] blogs. Be sure to check out my buddy Sean’s recent writings, along with Ms. Tee over at B-side Beirut, and Josh Hersh’s new blog. This POMED round-up also has a lot of worthwhile links on the [...]